Soviet history in hindsight : a comparative study of history textbooks in Russia, Ukraine and Estonia between 1980 and 2010 by Kurguzova, Ksenia
 
Université de Montréal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Soviet History in Hindsight: 
 
A Comparative Study of History Textbooks in Russia, Ukraine and 
Estonia between 1980 and 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
par 
 
Ksenia Kurguzova 
 
 
 
 
Département d’histoire 
 
Faculté des Arts et Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures 
 
en vue de l’obtention du grade de Maître ès art en Histoire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Juillet 2011 
 
© Ksenia Kurguzova, 2011 
 
Université de Montréal 
 
Faculté des études supérieures 
 
 
 
 
Ce mémoire intitulé: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Soviet History in Hindsight: A Comparative Study of History Textbooks 
in Russia, Ukraine and Estonia between 1980 and 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
présenté par 
 
Ksenia Kurguzova 
 
 
 
 
 
a été évalué par un jury composé des personnes suivantes : 
Samir Saul, president-rapporteur 
 
Yakov M. Rabkin, directeur de recherche 
 
Paul Létourneau, member du jury 
I 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our work will examine the crucial rupture between Soviet and Russian 
history from 1985 (1991 in some cases) through 2010, during which rival political 
leaders  of  Ukraine,  Estonia  and  Russia  had  an  opportunity  to  develop  and 
attempt to impose  their visions of their respective national identities and their 
history. 
 
 
 
 
 
The main goal of this study is to provide a new understanding of the 
connection between history, ideology, and development of national 
consciousness. The focus of the previous research in this domain concentrated on 
each  studied  country  in  particular.  Mainstream  historiography  left  unnoticed 
particularities  in the development of new political discourse in the peripheral 
states that emerged  from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The proposed study 
project will examine the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR on the socio- 
political  situation  in  Eastern  Europe.  It  should  shed  light  on  the  effects  the 
collapse of the Soviet Union had on the intensification of ethnic, nationalist and 
religious discourse in several former socialist republics. 
II 
 
 
 
 
We conducted a comparative study of recent history textbooks in several 
countries of Eastern Europe (in Russia, Ukraine and Estonia) and analyzed the 
new content of post-Soviet history textbooks used in Eastern European Secondary 
schools. Each of these countries followed a distinct path; therefore we aimed to 
reveal their  particular search for a new national identity and citizenship during 
the transitional period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: History – USSR; History – Russia; History – Ukraine; History – 
Estonia;  Postcommunism; Education – History – 1980-2010; Nationalism; 
Ethnicity 
III 
 
 
 
 
Résumé 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L’effondrement du communisme en 1991 en Russie a conduit à la 
 
révision  des  manuels  scolaires  d’histoire  en  Russie  et  dans  les  anciennes 
républiques  de  l’URSS.  Ce  travail  propose  d’évaluer  l’histoire  récente  post- 
communiste enseignée dans les classes supérieures du secondaire dans trois pays 
post-communistes. Nous allons s’attarder sur la présentation des divers périodes 
historiques  de  l’histoire  Soviétique  dans  les  manuels  scolaires  d’histoire  en 
Russie,  Ukraine et Estonie. Ce travail tente également d’examiner les diverses 
approches  dans  l’enseignement  d’histoire  dans  ces  trois  pays,  ainsi  que  de 
répondre   à   la   question   comment   les   nouveaux   manuels   redéfinissent   la 
perception de la culture et d’histoire des élèves dans chaque pays. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mots-clés : Histoire – URSS; Histoire – Russie; Histoire – Ukraine; Histoire 
 
 
–  Estonie;   Postcommunisme;   Enseignement   –   Histoire   –   1980-2010; 
Nationalisme; Ethnicité 
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Резюме 
 
 
 
 
 
 
В рамках данной работы мы изучили преподавание истории в 
 
школах трёх постсоветских государств: России, Украины и Эстонии. Было 
также  уделено  внимание  восприятию  истории  ХХ  века  населением  этих 
стран.  Были   собраны,  частично  переведены  с  национальных  языков  и 
проанализированы  около  50  школьных  учебников  истории  для  старших 
классов  из  России,  Украины  и  Эстонии.  Изученные  учебники  являются 
наиболее массовыми и иногда даже единственными в своём роде в школах 
этих государств. 
 
 
 
 
 
Анализ  школьных   учебников   истории,   приведённый   в  этой 
работе, этих стран показывает, что в отличие от России, Украина и Эстония 
пошли по пути преподавания подрастающему поколению 
националистической трактовки истории, основанной на мифах о древности 
своего народа, о высокой культурной миссии предков и о «заклятом враге». 
Россия, в свою очередь, сделала ставку на патриотическое воспитание нового 
поколения, умалчивая неприятные эпизоды из прошлого и прелагая новый, 
«позитивный» подход к изучению истории. 
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Эта работа ставит цель не только  проанализировать 
сложившуюся  ситуацию  в  школьном  образовании  в Восточной  Европе 
после распада Советского Союза, но и оценить роль преподавания истории 
в    создании   особенной,   уникальной   и,   зачастую,   националистической 
идеологии. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ключевые слова: История – СССР; История – Россия; История – Украина; 
История – Эстония; Посткоммунизм; Образование – История – 1980-2010; 
Национализм; Идеология 
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A Note on Transliteration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The citations’ original orthography is preserved and may vary depending on the 
editor or/and edition of a source. The translations were performed by me, unless 
noted otherwise. I used The Library of Congress’ ALA-LC Romanization Tables for 
transliteration. 
 
 
 
 
 
Les citations rapportées dans ce mémoire respectent l’orthographe et la mise en 
forme telles qu’elles se présentent dans la source imprimée du texte original, et 
varient donc selon les différents éditeurs. Toutes les traductions sont les miennes 
sauf avis contraire.  The Library of Congress’ ALA-LC Romanization Tables ont été 
utilisés pour translittération. 
 
 
 
 
 
Оригинальная  орфография  авторов  сохранена   и   может  отличаться   от 
приведённой ниже в зависимости от издания и/или издательства. Переводы 
произведены,  в  основной  своей  массе,  мной.  Транслитерация  в  работе 
выполнена  посредством  использования  таблиц  романизации  Библиотеки 
Конгресса США. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the end of his book, Postwar, Tony Judt tells us a popular Soviet-era 
 
joke: one day, there is a call on the "Armenian Radio." ‘Is it possible’, a caller asks, 
 
‘to foretell the future’? ‘Yes,’ comes the answer. ‘No problem. We know exactly 
what the future will be. Our problem is with the past: it keeps changing’.1  Indeed, 
ever since the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in October 1917, history ceased 
to be simply a scholarly enterprise and has turned into a powerful tool of politics. 
The historians were no longer free to interpret history on their own terms; instead 
they had  to follow  instructions  from the  Government. In  fact, no  branch  of 
learning was as tightly controlled in Stalinist and post-Stalinist Russia as history. 
 
 
 
 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 not only resulted in the creation 
of  independent  national  states,  but  also  opened  the  door  to  new  historical 
research, an opportunity to write a ‘different’ Soviet history, which prior to 1985 
(and even to 1991) was impossible because of restrictive Soviet policies. However, 
the  authors  of  school  history  textbooks  have  had  a  hard  time  approaching 
 
 
 
 
1   Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, New York, Penguin Press, 2005, p. 830. 
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Russia's past. On one hand, the collapse of communism in Russia necessitated the 
revision of past historical lessons; on the other hand the authors were unprepared 
and  scared  to  tackle  the  subject.  But  in  2007,  a  sensational  new  textbook  of 
Russia's modern  history, a collective work by 43 authors headed by Professor 
Andrei Borisovich Zubov  called A History Of Russia: The 20th Century (История 
России  XX  век.  Istoriia Rossii:  XX  vek)  was  published  in  Moscow.  It  covered 
Russia's past from the accession of the last tsar, Nicholas II, in 1896 to the events 
of 2007. This new book rejected the traditional nationalism that depicted Russia as 
the   invariable   victim  of   foreign  aggression.   Thus,   the   so-called  Molotov- 
Ribbentrop pact of 1939 is fully described, as is the  subsequent Soviet invasion 
and occupation of eastern Poland. So is the Katyn massacre of Polish officers. The 
book does not describe the building of the Berlin wall and the  deployment of 
Soviet missiles in Cuba. The new term emerges: ‚positive history‛. According to 
Alexander  Filippov,  the  author  of  the  controversial  history  text  book,  Joseph 
Stalin was a "contradictory" figure, while some people consider him evil; others 
recognize him as a "hero" for his role in the Great Patriotic War and his territorial 
expansion.2  In his interview to the Times Magazine, Filippov insisted that: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2A. Filippov, New History of Russia. 1945-2006, Moskva, Prosveshcheniye, 2007. 
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‚It is wrong to write a textbook that will fill the children who learn 
 
from it with horror and disgust about their past and their people. A 
generally positive tone for the teaching of history will build optimism 
and self-assurance in the growing young generation and make them 
feel as  if  they are part of their country’s bright future. A history in 
which there is good and bad, things to be proud of and things that are 
regrettable. But the general tone for a school textbook should still be 
positive.‛3 
 
 
 
 
 
We think that this thesis should address the indicated developments in 
Russia. Moreover, the comparative character of the research will also try to reveal 
certain tendencies peculiar to each of the former republics. One can argue that the 
destruction of the Soviet Union did not yield a new, liberal post-Soviet ideology. 
As a consequence, the  ex-communist countries are now facing the challenge of 
writing their own history.  Their experiences are different, maybe even simpler 
than in Russia, for their ‘recovered’ histories can rely on the common themes of 
occupation, cultural repression and national resistance. Also, the collapse of the 
Communist bloc left a void in educational systems of the former Soviet republics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3   The Times Magazine, December 1, 2009. 
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In  fact,  in  1989,  several  Soviet  republics  passed  a  law  on  national 
language.4  This law put the national languages in first place, and left Russian in 
second. In Ukraine, the introduction of Ukrainian as the sole state language and 
unique  language  of instruction, despite a high number of Russian citizens and 
citizens  preferring to use Russian, raised some questions. And lately, since the 
Orange Revolution, Russian media, politicians, and political scientists, have never 
stopped  criticizing Ukrainian textbooks  – for a  lack of  academic  content  and 
international  tolerance, for xenophobia and anti-Russian tones sometimes with 
the apologists of fascism, nationalism, and other unpardonable items. 
 
 
 
 
 
Baltic-Russian relations also have been complicated and tense since the 
collapse of the USSR and the restoration of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian 
independence, especially in the matters concerning their collective memory. Since 
the   beginning  of  the  1990s,  Europe  has  witnessed  a  series  of  heated  and 
politicized debates that question the ‘truth’ about painful episodes in the recent 
past. The breakdown of the old political order east of the Iron Curtain suddenly 
released   long-suppressed   controversies   about   ethnic   conflict,   political   and 
intellectual   culture,  and  past  atrocities.  Several  case-studies  examined  links 
between identity, memory politics and foreign policy in Baltic region. They also 
 
4  Usually the official status of the language was written into the new Constitution. For example, 
Decision on status of the Latvian Language (Supreme Council Latvian SSR, 06.10.1988) or Article 
13, Line 1 – of Constitution of Republic of Moldova. 
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analyzed  and  explained  developments  in  Baltic-Russian  relations  after  both 
NATO  and EU enlargement, and focused on the incompatibility of Baltic and 
Russian  post-Soviet  national  identity  constructions.  (Golubeva,  2010;  Tomiak, 
1992; Wulf and Grönholm, 2010) However, no comparative studies have been 
conducted on new content of school textbooks in Estonia. In the 2000s, Putin’s 
regime  started consciously to restore  and rehabilitate  the  Soviet symbols and 
Soviet version of history. But the Baltic States had a different truth and a different 
memory, which should find its reflection in its new school history textbooks. We 
should expect the shift in history education in Estonia to be rather striking. 
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Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
While evaluating the new versions of Eastern European post-communist 
history taught in schools, we will attempt to focus our attention on the different 
interpretations of social and political changes, as well as on following significant 
events: 
 
 
 
 
 
1.   October Revolution of 1917, its consequences, by what means people tried 
to preserve social, cultural, and economic order of the society, especially 
between   1917   and   1945,   the   importance   of   cultural   heritage,   and 
traditional values; 
2.   Stalin’s  mass  repressions  of  the  1930s,  its  impact  on  people  lives  and 
 
memory. Focus on Estonia, where repressions and the mass deportations 
were carried out by the Soviets; 
3.   Holodomor in Ukraine; 
 
4.   Post-war ‘Soviet occupation’ years; 
 
5.   The collapse of the Soviet Union and its impact on the development of its 
three   former  republics.  An  ideological  re-positioning  of  post-Soviet 
representation  of the historical narrative with the emphasis on cultural 
heritage, tradition, and patriotism in each of these countries. 
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Recent and continuing public and political debates in the USA, China, Japan, 
and  elsewhere, dealing with understandings of a nation-building and national 
identity, point out to parallels between the political significance of school history 
and the global  historical debates.5  International research on school history has 
been done by the UN, the Council of Europe, culminating in its latest publication 
is  History  Education  in   Europe:   Ten  Years  of  Cooperation  between  the  Russian 
Federation and the Council of Europe (2006). The Council of Europe’s major three- 
year project (1999-2001) Learning and Teaching about History of Europe in the 20th 
Century (2001) resulted in the final report  The 20th Century: an Interplay of Views 
(2001). However, no works had previously  compared, studied or analyzed the 
content of history textbooks in these three former  Communist countries. Upon 
completion of this research, we expect to reveal several peculiar characteristics in 
each  country’s  historical  education,  which  would  allow  us  to  discover  new 
tendencies  in  the  forming  of  national  identities,  as  well  as  discover  whether 
history in post-Soviet countries is still dominated by prejudice, propaganda, and 
state ideology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 J. Zajda, The Politics of Rewriting History: New School History Textbooks in Russia, In J. Zajda 
(Ed.), The International Handbook of Globalisation and Education Policy Research. 
Dordrecht, Springer, 2005. 
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Sources 
 
 
 
 
 
Our work will examine the crucial rupture between Soviet and Russian 
history from 1985 (1991 in some cases) through 2010, during which rival political 
elites of Ukraine, Estonia and Russia had an opportunity to develop and attempt 
to impose their visions of their respective national identities and their history. It 
will focus mainly on  popular history, including the material taught in schools, 
exhibited in museums and discussed in the press. Textbooks for ninth, tenth and 
eleventh  grades  will  be   analyzed  because  these  are  the  grades  in  which 
Communist and post-Communist history is presented in textbooks. The complete 
list of the selected textbooks can be found at the end of this work, where at first 
they are regrouped by the country of origin and then listed in alphabetical order. 
 
 
 
 
 
We limited our study to officially approved textbooks, which are used as 
part of  the national curriculum in three countries. For example, in Russia, The 
Ministry  of  Education of  the  Russian  Federation  compiles  an  annual list,  the 
Federal Set6, of textbooks that are officially accepted by the Russian government. 
We studied books recommended and authorized in this list and therefore used in 
 
 
6   "Об утверждении федеральных перечней учебников, рекомендованных (допущенных)  к 
использованию в образовательном процессе в образовательных учреждениях, реализующих 
образовательные программы общего образования и имеющих государственную 
аккредитацию, на 200X/20XX учебный год. 
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any school in Russia. Schools are obliged to use the officially approved textbooks, 
but are  free to use any kind of additional materials. However, teachers usually 
have the last word on which book they prefer to use in their class as well as on the 
approach to teaching Soviet and post-Soviet history. 
 
 
 
 
 
The  same  criteria  were  applied  to  choosing  Ukrainian  textbooks:  they 
were all officially approved by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education. After gaining 
independence,  Ukraine  chose  to  continue  the  centralized  Soviet  approach  to 
history   education   by   issuing   detailed   national   curricula   and   by   closely 
supervising the  textbook adoption, production and distribution process.   Each 
year The Ministry in  cooperation with the National Academy of Sciences, the 
Academy  of  Pedagogical   Sciences  and  private  publishers  and  foundations 
organizes competitions for new textbooks. The awarded textbooks are first tested 
in  schools  and  then  revised  several  times  if  necessary  before  being  officially 
recognized.  Like  in  Russia,  schools  have  no  choice  but  to  use  the  approved 
textbooks,  but  are  free  to  decide  on  approach  and  on  use  of  any  additional 
materials.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7Jan Germent Janmaat, ‚The Ethnic ‘Other’ in Ukrainian History Textbooks: the Case of 
Russia and the Russians,‛ Compare, vol. 37, no. 3 (June 2007), p. 313. 
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In Estonia the provision of general education at all levels of education is 
carried out on the basis of common national curricula irrespective of the language 
of instruction.  Schools prepare their own curricula on the basis of this national 
curricula. Basic education can be acquired partially in primary schools (grades 1– 
6), in basic schools (grades 1 – 9) or in upper secondary schools (grades 10 – 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compulsory basic school subjects include Estonian or Russian Language 
and  Literature,  two  foreign  languages  (English,  Russian,  German  or  French), 
Mathematics, Natural Science, Geography, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, History, 
Human Studies, Social Studies, Music, Art, Physical Education, Manual Training. 
Studying Estonian as a second language is obligatory in schools using Russian or 
another foreign language as the language of instruction. In order to successfully 
graduate from basic school, students are required to complete the curriculum and 
successfully pass three basic school  graduation examinations, which include an 
examination  in  Estonian  language  and   literature  or  Estonian  as  a  second 
language.8 
 
 
 
 
 
’Russian schools’ in Estonia use the very same textbooks that are used in 
 
Russian schools in Russia and will be analyzed in Chapter I of our work. Estonian 
 
 
8   Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, http://www.hm.ee/index.php?1510024. 
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textbooks used in Estonian–language schools are usually published in Estonian 
language  (although  there  are  some  that  are  adpated  to  ’Russian  schools’  in 
Estonia)  and  approved  by  the  Estonian  Ministry  of  Education  and  Research. 
These textbooks  will be studied in Chapter III of the present work. Moreover, 
since there are not so many different versions of the history textbooks in Estonia, 
the textbooks’ syllabi will be comapred and analyzed. 
 
 
 
 
 
The data for this research, gathered during my fieldwork in Moscow, Kiev 
and  Tallinn in May – June 2010, includes: Russian-language history textbooks, 
Ukrainian   history  textbooks  (in  Ukrainian),  Estonian  history  textbooks  (in 
Estonian),   newspaper   articles,   books,   general   field   observations,   museum 
exhibitions (such as  the Museum of Occupation and of Fight for Freedom in Estonia 
and the Ukrainian National Museum of History). My fieldwork in Estonia took place 
in  Tallinn,  at  the  National  Library  of  Estonia  (Eesti  Rahvusraamatukogu).  In 
Moscow I used sources from the Russian State Library (Российская 
государственная библиотека),  the  State Scientific Pedagogical Library (Научная 
педагогическая библиотека имени К.  Д. Ушинского) along with purchasing 
several  books  from  Dom  Knigi  bookstore.  Finally,  in  Kiev  I  worked  at  the 
Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (Національна бібліотека України імені В. І. 
Вернадського), the largest library in the country. 
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Dissertation Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In each chapter, we will examine the materials at three levels. First, we 
will lay out the historical patterns in high school education in each country and 
will try to find  similarities in the development of teaching history. Second, we 
will look at how things changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Third, the 
detailed investigations and the case studies will follow, focusing in particular on 
the  differences  between  these  three  countries.  Together,  these  three  chapters 
speak  to  the  broader  question  of  how  the  former  Communist  countries  are 
constructing a historical narrative that must encompass all spheres of life. 
 
 
 
More precisely, in the first chapter we will develop an argument about the 
role of school history texts in the shaping and transformation of national identity, 
using the  example of the latest history textbooks in Russia. In this chapter, we 
should confirm the existence of the ‚three most significant issues defining the re- 
positioning of the politically correct historical narratives – preferred images of the 
past, patriotism and national identity.‛9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9  Joseph Zajda (2004) 
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In the second chapter, following an examination of Russia’s post-Soviet 
history taught in schools, we will discuss the resulting issues of searching for a 
new national  identity  in  Ukraine, its emergence  as  a  multi-ethnic  and  multi- 
lingual  state,  its  search  for  a  new  ‚ethnic  other.‛ 10   We will  see  whether  the 
profound reforms of the Ukrainian educational system and structure succeeded 
in solving the existing dilemmas in creating a new identity in this country or did 
they, on the contrary, enhance ethnic intolerance and Russophobia in the country. 
This  chapter  will  also  shed  light  on  teaching  one  of  the  most  complex  and 
controversial pages in Ukrainian history, the famine of 1932-1933, the Holodomor. 
 
 
 
 
 
In the third chapter, we will trace how official history-teaching in Estonia 
changed from Soviet period and after national independence was regained in 
1991.  Contrary  to  expectations,  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  did  not 
 
automatically lead Estonian historians to pursue freely the research of their own 
history.  Instead younger historians were asked to write new history textbooks 
from a nationalist point of view.11  Last chapter will address these issues and will 
examine the following transformations. When we consider the chapters together, 
 
 
 
 
 
10  Jan Germen Janmaat, “The ethnic „other‟ in Ukrainian history textbooks: the case of Russia and 
the Russians,” Compare, vol. 37, no. 3 (June 2007), pp. 307-324. 
11   Meike Wulf and  Grönholm,  Pertti,  “Generating Meaning  Across Generations: The Role of 
Historians in The Codification of History in Soviet and Post-Soviet Estonia”, Journal of Baltic 
Studies, vol. 41, no. 3 (Spetember 2010), p.352. 
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it will be possible to detect broader shifts in teaching Soviet history in the post- 
communist context. 
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Chapter I 
 
 
 
 
Soviet History in Transition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‚Historians are dangerous and capable of turning 
 
everything topsy-turvy. They have to be watched.” 
N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1956 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian Empire: Enlightenment, Education, Opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  the  Russian  empire,  education  was  made  a  state  concern  in  the 
eighteenth century; it started developing rapidly, which led to an establishment 
of  a  university 12 ,  an  Academy  of  Sciences 13   and  of  secondary  schools 14 .  The 
Ministry of  Education was created in 1802, and the Great Reforms of the 1860s 
encouraged  the  education  of  newly  liberated  serfs’  as  well  as  expanding 
 
12  In 1775. 
13  The Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences was founded in 1724 by Peter the Great. 
14  In 1701, Peter the Great opened the first school in the world with a non-classical curriculum 
(Judge, p.127). 
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educational  opportunities  for  women. 15   In the  beginning,  Russian  educational 
norms  and traditions  were derivative of European approaches; later, however, 
they  were  fully  elaborated  and  developed  by  the  great  Russian  educational 
writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.16 
 
 
 
 
 
At first, religion and language posed problems for teachers: 
 
 
‚Many   progressive  thinkers  insisted  on  the  right  to  use  local 
languages  in  the  schools,  yet  most  also  believed  in  the  civilizing 
mission of empire and argued that the Russian language should also 
be taught. Reformers were overwhelmingly secular in orientation and 
believed that the Orthodox Church had no place in the schools. Yet 
many, believing in cultural autonomy, argued that local populations 
should be allowed to establish private confessional schools, whether 
Catholic, Muslim, or Orthodox. The practical problems involved in 
implementing such policies (teachers facing a classroom with children 
from  a  half  dozen  minority  groups,  for  example)  were  never 
confronted, and tensions over ethnic and linguistic issues mounted in 
Russia’s borderlands after 1900.‛ 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15   B. Eklof, L. Holmes and Vera Kaplan, Educational reform in post-Soviet Russia : legacies and 
prospects, London, F. Cass, 2005, p. 4. 
16    The  writings  of  Mikhail  Lomonosov,  Vissarion  Belinsky,  Nikolai  Chernyshevsky, 
Nikolai   Dobrolyubov,   Konstantin   Ushinsky,   Dmitrii   Pisarev  and   Lev  N.   Tolstoy 
contributed to the development of new Russian approach to education. 
17  Eklof, B., Holmes, L. and Vera Kaplan, Educational reform in post-Soviet Russia : legacies 
and prospects, London, F. Cass, 2005, p. 6. 
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But when the Russian Revolutions of 1917 swept away the remains of the 
old tsarist empire and the brutal civil war18  destroyed the state and social order, 
the  new  Bolshevik  leaders  started  creating  a  new,  secular,  democratic  and 
progressive school system. Open access to free education was guaranteed by the 
State for all workers and peasants. 
 
 
 
 
 
1917 – 1985: Imprisoned History 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Stalinist school system created after 1931 imposed a uniformity and 
hierarchy upon education across the vast territories and ethnically diversified 
populations of the Soviet Union (Estonia was not a part of the USSR yet). By 1953, 
whether  in Ukraine, Russia, or Moldavia, all schools followed the same lesson 
plans, textbooks were exactly the same and teaching methods were 
indistinguishable. 19    In  Moscow  and  Leningrad,  Vologda  and  Yekaterinburg, 
teachers were not allowed to produce any versions of history different from the 
one  of   their  leadership.  Slavery,  feudalism,  capitalism  and  socialism  were 
interpreted with the help of Marx's theory of history. The Russian Marxists were 
 
 
18   1918-1921. 
19   B. Eklof, L. Holmes and Vera Kaplan, Educational reform in post-Soviet Russia: legacies and 
prospects, London, F. Cass, 2005, p. 7. 
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the ‚leading  interpreters of historical development‛. According to the historian 
Marc  Ferro,  ‚since  they  held  sole  power  after  the  October  revolution<  they 
counted as  true prophets who had been right all along. Other socialist bodies 
objected to this  view, and they could easily show that Russia had not passed 
through the stage of capitalism and so was not ripe for socialism. Thereafter, the 
political debate became a historical one, and the Bolsheviks did not mean to let 
historians’ history invalidate the  leader’s own judgments as to the history was 
about to happen‛.20 
 
 
 
 
 
In the USSR, the past was never left to chance. Academic research was 
tightly controlled, public access to information was limited, but most importantly, 
history-writing  and teaching was overseen by the State. The Communist Party 
became both the source and the incarnation of history. Soviet leaders, people and 
children were educated in accordance with the Short History21  which was written 
with Stalin’s assistance in the 1930s. Historian Catherine Merridale wrote: 
 
 
 
‚There was one single history textbook for all schools. Students were 
 
required to learn it more or less verbatim. They were examined orally 
 
 
20  Marc Ferro, The Use and Abuse of History, or, How The Past Is Taught, London, Boston, 
Melbourne and Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, p.115. 
21   "A Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Encyclopædia Britannica, 
Encyclopædia Britannica Online Academic Edition, Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011. Web: 29 
Apr, 2011. 
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at  the  end  of  the  year,  and  marks<were  awarded  for  accurate 
 
renditions of its contents.‛ 22 
 
 
 
Stalin  personally  read  and  commented  on  historical  publications,  and 
maintained strict censorship over history-writing. A number of historians who 
refused to tow the government line were persecuted by the State. In 1931 alone, 
over  100  historians were  arrested,  some  of  whom were  executed,  and others 
emigrated.23  Some of the remaining historians ‚were required to align their work 
with the principle of partiinost’24. 
 
 
 
Later, in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s this course was used as well, though 
both  Khrushchev and Brezhnev altered it in order to legitimize  their actions, 
views and policies. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign led to the omission 
of  Stalin’s  name  from  the  school  manuals.  For  example,  in  the  fourth-class 
textbook of 1956 Stalin  appears only twice between 1917 and 1953.25  But while 
Stalin  was  criticized,  Lenin’s  Revolution,  Civil  War  measures,  imposition  of 
single-party  rule  and  the  harsh  collectivization  were  still  beyond  approach. 
Khrushchev’s thaw was revolutionary, but it failed to free history from its official 
 
 
 
22   Catherine  Merridale,  ‚Redesigning   History  in  Contemporary  Russia‛,   Journal  of 
Contemporary History, vol. 38, no. 1 (2003), p.15. 
23  Arup Banerji, Writing history in the Soviet Union: making the past work, New Delhi, Social 
Science Press, 2008, p. 35. 
24   Party line was the official way to think, to act and to proceed. 
25   Marc Ferro, The Use and Abuse of History, or, How The Past Is Taught, London, Boston, 
Melbourne and Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, p.116. 
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bounds.26  After Khrushchev’s fall, in 1964, some aspects of Stalinist history were 
reinstated. Once again it became forbidden to publish new information unless it 
had already appeared in print somewhere else; and several young historians, who 
were   successfully  published  in  Khrushchev’s  time,  had  suddenly  become 
unprintable and their promotions were blocked.27 
 
 
 
 
The main aim of the system, however, remained the same – to produce a 
man who subscribes to a particular type of morality – communist or socialist, the 
New Soviet man. This man would be free from both, ethnic or cultural affiliations, 
devoted to the motherland, would have the good of society at heart and would 
work for the wealth and happiness of future generations. This goal was achieved, 
but the results were devastating: while creating the New Soviet man, the Soviet 
educational system  successfully produced a new Soviet-type mentality, which 
remains detrimental to Russian society even today. Nevertheless, the 
achievements  of  the  Soviet  school  were  significant.  First,  it  was  effective  in 
delivering full literacy under Stalin and, later, under his successors it gave access 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26   Kathleen E. Smith describes in detail history in the thaw period in Smith, Kathleen E. 
Remembering Stalin’s Victims: Popular Memory and the End of the USSR. Ithaca, London, 
Cornell University press, 1996, in chapter 2: Khrushchev’s Thaw. 
27     Catherine  Merridale,  ‚Redesigning   History  in  Contemporary  Russia‛,   Journal  of 
Contemporary History, vol. 38, no. 1 (2003), p.16. 
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to a complete secondary education to the population of a large, ethnically and 
linguistically diverse country.28 
 
 
 
 
 
Perestroika, Glasnost, Freedom of Speech? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But by the end of the Brezhnev era29, the Soviet school system was in 
crisis.   It  suffered  from  chronic  under-funding,  lacked  amenities  and  was 
overcrowded  and outdated. The teaching profession had lost its prestige, while 
underpaid  and  overworked  teachers  left  in  large  numbers.  So  there  was  no 
surprise, when in 1986, a year after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, a dynamic 
reform movement emerged in  education. Soon after Gorbachev was appointed 
General  Secretary  of  the  Communist  Party,  a  new  policy  of  glasnost 30    was 
launched.  And  immediately  millions  of  Soviet  citizens  became  passionately 
involved in the rediscovering of their own history. Previously banned historical 
literature was becoming extremely popular. New publications appeared every 
 
 
 
 
28   B. Eklof, L. Holmes and Vera Kaplan, Educational reform in post-Soviet Russia: legacies and 
prospects, London, F. Cass, 2005, p. 8. 
29   1964-1982. 
30   Glas – voice (Russian). It was the policy of maximal openness, and transparency in the 
activities of all government institutions in the Soviet Union, guaranteed by the freedom of 
speech, press and information. 
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day and aroused immense interest among the Soviet reading public. Books, short 
stories and newspaper articles became important source of historical information. 
Nonetheless, it is important to mention, that the rate of progress of glasnost was 
different in each  Soviet  republic: ‚the  Baltic Republics were well in front, the 
Ukraine in the rear. But  in  every republic during 1988 the delicate issue of the 
history   of   the   nationalities,   and   of  national  repression   under   Stalin,  has 
increasingly come under scrutiny‛.31 
 
 
 
 
 
Everyone  understood  that  school  history  textbooks  were  no  longer 
credible. The school curriculum needed to be revised. History became front-page 
news and politicians, journalists, teachers and parents joined in collective effort in 
order to find the best way to present Soviet history to the new generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
In December 1991, the Russian Republic emerged and the Soviet Union 
officially ceased to exist. Russia, now a fully independent state set a new course in 
the  direction of ‚inward-looking  nation building‛.32        However, the collapse of 
communism did not set history free. Numerous attempts have been made since 
 
 
 
 
31   R. W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution, Bloomington and  Indianapolis, 
Indiana University Press, 1989, p. 10. 
32   John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and The Fall of The Soviet Empire, Princeton, New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1993, p.285. 
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1991  to  reinvent  history:  ‚It   was  by  turns  a  source  of  legitimation  for  new 
governments, a generator of transformatory rage, a set of falsified details to be 
put  right, and a sort of consolation for those who feared that their society had 
preserved few cultural resources beyond its bitter memories and loss.‛33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Yeltsin Years: Difficult Transition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first President of Russia, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin had difficulty 
deciding what to do with the Russian and Soviet past. Transitioning a communist 
state to a democratic one, a command economy to a market economy, and a large 
multiethnic  empire into a nation-state proved to be an extremely difficult task. 
Yeltsin’s  address   which  called  for  atonement  and  admission  of  guilt  for 
Communist crimes failed  to find popular approval. Russia in transitional years 
lacked the ‚surge of social  solidarity‛34   that characterized other East European 
societies. People in those other countries saw themselves as victims of Moscow’s 
domination  and  strived  for  self-determination.  Georgia,  Hungary,  the  Baltic 
 
 
 
33  Catherine Merridale, “Redesigning History in Contemporary Russia”, Journal of Contemporary 
History, vol. 38, no. 1 (2003), p.13. 
34  Tatyana Volodina, “Teaching History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR,” The History 
Teacher, vol. 38, no. 2 (Febuary 2005), p. 181. 
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Republics, along with other states, accused the former Soviet leadership of having 
repressed  them  and  directed  their  resentment  against  the  Russian  version  of 
Soviet history. As a result, during his nine-year presidency, Vladimir Putin began 
constructing his version of Russia’s history by emphasizing the need for reforms 
and strong leadership to help Russia in troubled times. 
 
 
 
 
 
Putin and Medvedev: New Historical Perspectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Putin spoke early in his term about how a new historical perspective was 
needed  to help form a national  idea  that would  unify  Russia and he  took  a 
personal  interest  in  the  history  taught  in  school,  specifically  concerning  the 
textbooks Russian students were using. He reintroduced into political discourse 
theories of Russia’s historical uniqueness and reminded Russians about their past 
great   ancestors   such   as   Catherine   the   Great,   Peter   the   Great,   and   also, 
controversially, Joseph Stalin. 
 
 
 
President  Dmitry  Medvedev  continued  on  the  path  set  out  by  his 
predecessor, even  going a  step further  by engaging the  legal field  to protect 
Russian   history.  In  2009,  Medvedev  created  a  new  committee,  Presidential 
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Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the 
Detriment of Russia's Interests, and signed a law that is supposed to protect Russia 
from falsifications of its own history.35 
 
 
 
It is important to stress, that Russia has, for centuries, been and remains 
the most important Slavonic country, largely because of its size, cultural heritage, 
population,  economy  and  history.  Also  Russia  occupies  the  largest  territory, 
nearly twice the  size  of China. The country began its territorial growth in the 
seventeenth century, when the Tsarist empire expanded greatly in all directions, 
adding to its crown many  non-Russian territories in Eastern Europe and Asia, 
inhabited by  people  of  very  diverse  ethnic  origin,  race  and  religion.  In  the 
twenty-first century Russia remains a  multi-national country. According to the 
2002 census, over 160 separate ethnic groups populate its vast territory. Of the 
total   population   of   140   million,   80   per   cent   are   Russian. 36       Russia   
is, geographically, demographically, culturally, historically and ideologically, 
both European and Asiatic.  In 1837, in attempt to better explain Russia’s 
uniqueness, one of  the most prominent Russian philosophers, Pyotr 
Yakovlevich Chaadaev 
wrote: 
 
 
 
35     Kомиссия  при  президенте  Российской  Федерации  по  противодействию   
попыткам фальсификации истории в ущерб интересам России. The decree was issued in 
order to "defend Russia against falsifiers of history and those who would deny Soviet contribution 
to the victory in World War II. The President of Russian Federation decree 15.05.2009, no. 549 
(Указ Президента РФ от 15.05.2009, no. 549). 
36   Edwin Bacon, Contemporary Russia, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 
48. 
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‚Situated  between the two great divisions of the world, between East 
 
and West, with one elbow leaning on China and the other on Germany, 
we should have combined in us the two great principles of intelligent 
nature, imagination and reason, and have united in our civilization the 
past of the entire world. But this is not the part which Providence has 
assigned to us< Historical experience does not exist for us.‛37 
 
 
Using  these  characteristics,  ever  since  1991,  Russia’s  government  has 
actively  sought  to  recreate  Russian  national  identity,  based  on  ‚a particular 
narrative  emphasizing  Russia’s  distinctiveness  among  European  nations‛. 38 
Today, politicians are constantly invoking the nation, in attempt to unite and 
 
inspire people, but at the same time they avoid defining its meaning.39  They do 
assert,  however, that a common language, political discourse and written texts 
(especially in  schools) play a crucial role in the creation of a national identity, 
mainly by creating a sense of solidarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Historians agree: ‚For  centuries, Russia’s national identity rested on its 
 
position at the center of a geographical and ideological empire< As a result, 
 
Russian   and   Soviet   identities   were   closely   intertwined.   The   conceptual 
 
 
 
37 Pyotr Chaadayev, Philosophical Letters & Apology of a Madman, Knoxville, The University 
of Tennessee Press, 1969, p. 41. 
38   Edwin Bacon, Contemporary Russia, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 2. 
39    The  distinctions  have  to  be  drawn  between  русские  (russkie)  –  ethnic  Russians, 
российские  (rossiiskie)  –  belonging  to  the  Russian  State,  and  Россияне  (Rossiiane)  – 
Russian citizens of the Russian Federation. 
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relationship between the two entities became increasingly complex< *and can be 
linked+ to the disintegration of the USSR‛.40     After 1991 politicians in Russia made 
several  attempts  to  ‘de-ideologize’  the  curriculum by  allowing  the  use  of 
different   historical   sources,   by   introducing   sociology,   philosophy,   global 
education,  by  teaching  Russian  law  (Constitution)  and  even  religion.  Central 
authorities have allowed the regions and municipalities to choose what they will 
teach  and  how  they  will  teach  it.  However,  due  to  lack  of  funding,  schools 
continued to  use old Soviet textbooks throughout the 1990s. Another subject of 
great interest was the teaching of history. ‚Narratives of conquest, expropriation, 
deportation, exploitation, and  even genocide were long banished from school 
textbooks, and the creation of the Russian empire was often described in fairy-tale 
terms‛.41   Furthermore, Russian school  textbooks paid (and still pay) little or no 
attention  to  the  Soviet  repressions  and  mass  deportations  of  ethnics  groups, 
actions against minorities, the Red Army’s wartime  atrocities, and continuous 
injustices towards its own citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40  Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, ‚Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era 
Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow‛, Annals of Association of 
American Geographers, vol. 92, no. 3 (2002), pp. 528. The same view is expressed by Zubov 
(2009), Kotkin (2000), and others. 
41  Vera Kaplan,‚The  reform of education in Russia and the problem of history teaching; 
Education in Russia,‛ The Independent States and Eastern Europe, vol. 17, no. 1 (1999). 
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At the same time, the new history textbooks in Russia portray a new, post- 
Soviet national identity. It is the first time since the 1920s that attempts have been 
made to redefine and to re-position core values of Russian society. It is also the 
first time when a student is asked to engage his critical approach to history. In the 
following  pages  we   will   examine  the  abovementioned  duality  of  Russian 
historical narrative in school. 
 
 
 
 
 
Patriotism, Nationalism or both? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The new history textbooks that appeared in Russian schools in the mid- 
nineties  had  a  reproachful,  anti-communist  tone.  Revolutionary  heroes  were 
dethroned, the conservatism of the Soviet politicians was denounced and the 
entire  Soviet period was portrayed as a chain of terror. The communist leaders 
were either depicted as tyrants (Stalin, Yezhov, Beria, Lenin), or narrow-minded 
bureaucrats  (Khrushchev  and Brezhnev). According  to the  historian Tatyana 
Volodina, ‚learning from these books, students too readily concluded that, as the 
proverb  goes, every  nation  gets  the  government  it  deserves.  In  other  words, 
perhaps  the  main  trouble  was  not  the  government  but  the  Russian  people 
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themselves.‛42   Often the importance of remembering one’s history in order to 
 
avoid repeating past mistakes was highlighted: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‚The  Revolutionary way is wrong for Russia; it leads not to a national 
unity but to the catastrophe for people. A person who forgets its past is 
destined to repeat it<  The most important condition for a country’s 
stability  is  patriotism.  This  feeling  can  be  painful,  but  is  never 
denigrating. The history of the XXth century proved wastefulness of 
‚hysterical‛  patriotism,  based  on  humiliation  of  other  nations,  on 
 
despise and jealousy. On the contrary, it is clear now that the idea of 
 
strong, stable country is unifying.‛43 
 
 
 
 
 
In the textbooks of the 2000s, the spirit of patriotism, nationalism and 
other significant images are used to depict Russian national and cultural identity. 
For example, in several textbooks students are reminded about Russia’s greatness 
and about the significant role it played in history: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42  Tatyana Volodina, “Teaching History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR,” The History 
Teacher, vol. 38, no. 2 (Febuary 2005), p. 182. 
43  V. P. Ostrovskii and A. Utkin, I., Istoriia Rossii. XX vek. 11 kl., Moscow, Drofa, 1998, pp. 3-4. 
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‚< To treasure< this heritage *Russian history, culture and traditions+ 
 
– means to cultivate within oneself the love for the Motherland, the 
feelings of patriotism, and citizenship.‛44 
 
 
 
‚XIX  century finally created Russia into a great nation in the world< 
This  was  achieved  through  our  people’s  sufferings  and  won  by 
complete defeat in the war 1812< Not a single issue of the world’s 
politics could be decided without Russia.‛45 
 
 
‚In  XXth  century  Russia  played  exceptional  role  in  the  history  of 
humanity<   In   several   decades,   the   USSR   became   the   world’s 
superpower. Soviet Union had surpassed its other competitors, as well 
as the United States, in different branches of science and technology.‛46 
 
 
 
Similar  discourse  can  be  found  in  Istoriia  Rossii,  konets  XVII-XIX  vek: 
uchebnik dlia 10 klassa obshcheobrazovatel'nykh uchrezhdenii (History of Russia, XVII- 
XIX Centuries: Grade 10 Secondary School Manual): 
 
 
‚Everything  that was achieved – was the fruit of the efforts by the 
Russians.   However,   taking   into   the   account   of   the   collective 
achievements of the whole population of the Russian empire, one also 
 
 
44B. Rybakov and A. Preobrazhenski, Istoriia Otechestva: uchebnik dlia 8 klassa srednei shkoly, 
Moscow, Prosveshchenie, 1993, p. 273. Translated by Joseph Zajda in Zajda, J., The Politics 
of Rewriting History: New School History Textbooks in Russia, In J. Zajda (Ed.), The 
International Handbook of Globalisation and Education Policy Research. Dordrecht, 
Springer, 2005. 
45   A. Danilov and L. Kosulina, Istoriia Rossii: XX vek,  Moscow, Prosveshchenie ,  
2002, 
p.253. 
46   N. Zagladin and al., Istoriia Otechestva: XX vek. Moscow, Russkoe Slovo, 2006, p. 
383. 
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needs  to  consider the  contributions  of  its leading individuals<  the 
 
history of Russia is infinite , excitingly interesting, full of mysteries and 
 
‘blank pages’.‛47 
 
 
 
 
The abovementioned history textbook is recommended by the Ministry of 
Education and is widely used in schools. Books by other authors invite Russian 
youth to use an individual, critical and analytical approach to history: 
 
 
 
‚The crucial periods of the past will pass by our reflective gaze: Russia 
with its bright and dark pages of life prior to 1917<the depressing 
shadow of massive repressions<the  growth of our Fatherland, with 
great achievements and unforgiving errors<More than ever before it is 
necessary for you to explain<the inner logic of a historical process, and 
find  the answers to the questions why such events occurred< You 
need  to  understand  historical  facts  for  what  they  are,  rather  than 
guessing and rushing to categorize them in ideological schemes.‛48 
 
 
Or again, 
 
 
 
 
‚In  your hands you have a new history textbook. With its help we 
 
suggest that you consider a complex and contradictory past of our 
 
country<We hope that you will develop your own view point<Let’s 
 
 
 
 
47   V. Buganov and P. Zyrianov, Istoriia Rossii, konets XVII-XIX vek: uchebnik dlia 10 klassa 
obshcheobrazovatel'nykh  uchrezhdeni,  Prosveshchenie,  2000,  p.  10.  Translated  by  Joseph 
Zajda. 
48  A. Levandovskii and Y. Shchetinov, Rossiia v XX veke, Moscow, Prosveshchenie, 2001, 
pp. 3-4. Translated by Joseph Zajda. 
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reflect together about our past, so that we could walk bravely the path 
 
towards democratic and humane society.‛49 
 
 
 
Civil War - Red Terror- Stalinism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the key school texts (of the 1990s and 2000s; by Danilov and Kosulina, 
Zharova  anf  Mishina,  Kreder,  Ostrovskii,  Denisenko,  Zagladin,  Pashkov  and 
Shestakov) Russian students learn about Russia at the end of the XIXth century, 
two   Russian  revolutions  of  1905  and  1917,  the  Civil  War,  Stalinism  and 
totalitarianism, World War II, the after-war reconstruction, Khrushchev’s thaw 
and  Brezhnev’s  stagnation,  the  perestroika  years  of  1985-1991,  and  ‘The  New 
Russia’. 
 
 
 
The events of February and October 1917 are often described in a couple 
of  paragraphs.  Young  readers  are  told  that  tsar  Nikolai  had  ‘missed  his  last 
chance’ for  transformation and therefore failed to make it less painful for the 
country to transition into a new phase of history. Some books introduce the most 
charismatic revolutionary leader, Lev Trotsky50; some do not mention him at all51. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49   V.  Denisenko,  V.  Izmozik,  V.  Ostrovskii  and  V.  Startsev,  Istoriia  Otechestva,  
Saint- Petersburg, SpetsLit, 2000, p. 5. Translated by Joseph Zajda. 
50  For example, the new edition of Istoriia Rossii by Danilov and Kosulina, or Kreder (1992) 
51  Pashkov, Volobuev and Zagladin textbooks. 
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The  Civil  War  chapter  usually  describes  first  Soviet  legislation,  White 
movement, the situation in Ukraine (which in some books is described as an 
attempt  to ‚sit  on two chairs‛52),  the Red Terror, and the national politics in 
satellite  countries. The liquidation of the Romanovs is presented as one of the 
worst pages in Russian history: 
 
 
 
‚On   July,  evidently  by  the  order  from  the  Sovnarkom,  the  Ural 
regional  Soviet  had  decided  to  execute  Nikolai  Romanov  and  his 
entire  family.  During  the  night  of  17  July<  a  bloody  tragedy 
occurred.  Nikolai,  together  with  his  wife,  his  five  children  and 
servants were executed – eleven people in total<Earlier,  the tsar’s 
brother Michael was executed in Perm<  Also were executed and 
thrown down the mine shaft were eighteen members of the Royal 
family.‛53 
 
 
Surprisingly enough, the textbooks of the nineties do not talk about these 
events.  I was not able to find a single mention of the executions of the Army 
officers  in  any   of  them  (for  example,  in  Zharova  and  Mishina’s  textbook, 
published in 199654, or  in  Kreder’s and Ostrovskii’s manuals, published in 1996 
and  1998,  respectively).  However,  this  fact  can  be  explained  by  the  difficult 
historical climate of the nineties: Boris Yeltsin and his contemporaries simply did 
 
 
52  I. Mishina and L. Zharova, Istoriia Otechestva., Moscow, Russkoe Slovo, 1999, p. 212. 
53   A. Danilov and L. Kosulina, Istoriia Rossii: XX vek, Moscow, Prosveshchenie , 2001, p. 
115. 
54   L.  Zharova  and  I.  Mishina,  Istoriia Otechestva: 1900-1940,  Saint-Petersburg,  Harford, 
1996. 
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not know how to begin to address the deep Soviet past. Only in 1998, when the 
remains of the Royal family were officially identified, it was decided to give the 
last Russian  Tsar, his wife, and their five children a proper burial. In the early 
2000s the first mentions of these events started to appear in the textbooks. 
 
 
 
 
World War II: Painful Memories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Soviet victory in WWII was a unifying event in the Russian historical 
narrative. But in the nineties it was no longer a source of pride. New textbooks 
concentrated on the devastating results of the war. It was reported that dozens of 
millions of people lost their lives to protect their country. Russia lost more than 
twenty million people in four years, while Germany, which fought longer and on 
larger  territory, lost  fifteen  million.  The  Soviet regime  won  the  war but  at  a 
tremendous cost. At the same time, former Soviet republics were producing their 
own versions of the twentieth century history, stating that Stalinism was no better 
than  Nazism  and  did,  in  fact,  produce  as  many  crimes  on  their  territories. 
Russians started feeling guilty, inferior and indebted. They soon, however, grew 
tired of it and a new ‚positive‛ approach to history started gaining ground. 
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In the  Soviet  textbooks,  fascism  is  presented  as  the  ultimate  evil.  The 
whole  history of the twentieth century is remembered through the patterns of 
historical trauma of 1941-1945. The Red Army soldier is portrayed as a hero and 
liberator  of  Eastern  Europe,  not  as  an  enemy  or  an  occupant.  The  war  is 
memorialized not as the World War II but as the Great Patriotic War. The years 
1939 – 1941 are downplayed: there is no mention of an alliance between the Soviet 
 
Union with Nazi Germany, of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact or of any repressions 
against the Armed Forces command. 
 
 
 
In  the  post-Communist  narrative,  there  are  two  extremes:  National 
Socialism and Communism. World War II is described as a tragedy, which cost 28 
million  lives. 55   At  the  beginning,  the  textbooks  avoid  mentioning  the  cost  of 
victories. Later,  however, the truth comes out: twenty Soviet soldiers died for 
every  German  soldier   killed 56  .  Equally  important,  the  section  on  Stalin’s 
Repressions is usually limited  either to a single paragraph (in the nineties), or 
only a couple of pages (in 2001 and later). The 1999 textbook for Grade 10, Istoriia 
Otechestva [History of the Fatherland], is one of the few books providing a more 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55   V.  Shestakov,  M.  Gorinov  and  E.  Viazemski,  Istoriia  Otechestva:  XX  vek,  
Moscow, Prosveshchenie , 2002. 
56  Richard Overy, Russia’s War, London, Penguin, 1999, p. 117. 
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detailed account of the arrest and execution of the top leadership in the party and 
the Armed Forces.57 
 
 
 
The book by Dmitrienko, Istoriia Otechestva - XX vek describes how the 
repressions began following the murder of Kirov and how later they turned into 
mass hysteria in the 1930s: 
 
 
 
‚Three  quarters  out  of  the 1  961  Party members  of  the  XVII  Party 
Congress   were   executed<   45   %   of   the   Army   Command   were 
repressed. Over 40 000 people were cleansed from the ranks of the Red 
Army< Terror was happening in every Soviet Republic. Among the 
repressed were Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Georgians<‛58 
 
 
‚Even  the former heads of the NKVD—Yagoda and Yezhov, who both 
played  a major role in the Red Terror, were executed,‛  - mention Mishina and 
Zharova in their Grade 10 and 11 textbook.59  The book by Danilov and Kosulina 
opens its chapter on Repressions by asking a question ‚What is totalitarianism?‛60 
It then proceeds to answer this question: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57  I. Mishina and L. Zharova, Istoriia Otechestva., Moscow, Russkoe Slovo, 1999, pp. 386- 
387. 
58   V. P. Dmitrienko, Istoriia Otechestva - XX vek, Moscow, Drofa, 1999, pp. 237-243. 
59      I. Mishina and L. Zharova, Istoriia Otechestva., Moscow, Russkoe Slovo, 1999, pp.386- 
387. 
60   A. Danilov and L. Kosulina, Istoriia Rossii: XX vek, Moscow, Prosveshchenie , 1998. 
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‚Totalitarianism  is a political system that existed in the USSR in the 
 
1930s<By   the   mid-thirties   Marxist-Leninist   ideology   became   the 
official State ideology. But it was not enough, in order to support itself 
the   totalitarian   system   employed   a   large   number   of   repression 
mechanisms< Prisons were overcrowded< In the army alone 40 000 
officers were executed.‛61 
 
 
Then students are asked to answer the following questions: ‚What are the 
main  reasons for the establishment of the totalitarian regime in the USSR? Are 
there any examples of resistance to Stalin’s regime? Please prove that the CPSU62 
was the main axle of the totalitarian system.‛63 
 
 
 
However, the discussion of the repressions, once nonexistent in the Soviet 
Union,  remained limited in the 1990s and the 2000s.  The  Great Patriotic war 
glorified war veterans and justified the sacrifices of millions. Each student, who 
joins the classroom  discussion on this period of time, has a grandfather or a 
grandmother who fought in the war, but no one seems to have a relative who was 
a member of the NKVD64. Also,  while the textbooks acknowledged the Stalin 
government’s  early  mistakes  during  the  conduct  of  the  war,  as  well  as  the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61   Ibid., pp. 178-184. 
62  Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
63  A. Danilov and L. Kosulina, Istoriia Rossii: XX vek, Moscow, Prosveshchenie , 1998., pp. 
184-185. 
64  Soviet secret police. 
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heroism of the people in an unequal battle, they left the role of the minorities in 
the Soviet victory unspecified. 
 
 
 
Stalin’s Politics and Mass Repressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As it was mentioned earlier, the discussions and debates about Russian 
history textbooks became front-page news in June 2007 when a teacher’s manual 
by A.V. Filippov, The Contemporary History of Russia, 1945-2006, was released. In 
2009, a textbook for students based on this teacher’s manual, History of Russia: 
 
1945-2008: 11th Grade was also published. 
 
 
 
 
The  controversial  section  of  Filippov’s  text  about  Stalin  begins  by 
 
acknowledging that Stalin is a ‚polarizing‛ figure and that some view him as a 
 
‚hero‛ and others see him as ‚the embodiment of evil itself‛ 65: 
 
 
 
 
‚Iosif Vissarianovich Stalin (Jughashvili) remains one of the most 
polarizing  figures  in  the  politics  and  history  of  our  country;  it  is 
difficult  to  find  another  personality  in  Russian  history  who  is 
subjected to so many contradictory interpretations, both during his 
 
 
 
 
65     A.  V.  Filippov,  New  History  of  Russia  1945-2006,  Moscow,  Prosveshchenie,  2007. 
Translated by Anatolii Karlin. 
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rule and after. For some, he is the hero and orchestrator of victory in 
 
the Great Patriotic war; to others, he is the embodiment of evil itself.‛ 
 
 
 
Filippov then proceeds to justify Stalin’s legacy and methods: 
 
 
 
 
‚One of the most famous views on the historical significance of Stalin 
was  held by Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Great Britain 
during World War Two, and a man hardly known for his pro Stalin 
sentiments: ‚Stalin came to Russia with a wooden plough and left in 
its possession nuclear weapons‛. 
 
 
‚During  Stalin's life the first view predominated; after his death the 
second became conventional wisdom, primarily because of 
revelations   about   Stalin’s   organizational   role   in   the   political 
repressions of the 1930’-s and 1940’-s. Evaluating Stalin’s historical 
significance  requires  looking  at  him  in  a  wider  historical  context, 
beyond just the chronological framework of the Soviet period. This 
approach  reveals  many  similarities  between  Stalin’s  policies  and 
those of preceding Russian sovereigns.‛ 
 
 
‚The  guiding light of these principles was concentration of authority 
in  one center and strict centralization of the administrative system. 
The power of Russia’s paramount leader was traditionally absolutist, 
drawing  in  all  resources  and  subordinating  all  political  forces  to 
itself.‛ 
 
 
 
What was the cause of the repressions? According to Filippov, Stalin’s black and 
white view of the world‛ was to blame: 
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‚Of course Stalin’s personal qualities informed the intense drama and 
 
stresses of the Soviet period. Contemporary accounts and later 
psychological investigations show that the defining feature of Stalin’s 
personality was his black and white worldview (which explains his 
perception of the people around him as either friends or enemies), a 
perception that he was in a permanently hostile environment, 
characterized  by  cruelty,  and  a  drive  to  dominate.  However,  the 
influence of Stalin’s psychological idiosyncrasies was most likely of 
secondary   importance   relative   to   the   role   of   objective   factors. 
Carrying through a program of accelerated modernization required a 
certain  system  of  power  and  the  creation  of  an  administrative 
apparatus up to the task. In many ways these reasons explain the 
scale and spirit of Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’. ‚66 
 
 
He does mention the price the Soviet population had to pay for Stalin’s 
 
policies, but then tries to justify its scale: 
 
 
 
 
‚But Stalin’s rule had another side. His successes – and they are 
acknowledged by many of the Leader’s opponents – were achieved 
through the ruthless exploitation of the population. During Stalin’s 
rule   the   country   went   through   several   waves   of   large   scale 
repressions. The initiator and theorist behind this ‘heightened class 
struggle’  was  Stalin  himself.  Entire  social  classes  like  the  landed 
peasantry, the urban petit bourgeoisie, the priesthood and the old 
intelligentsia were liquidated. Furthermore, on occasion many people 
completely loyal to power suffered from the harsh laws. It is not even 
worth going into the safety of life during the Stalin years. Quality of 
 
66  Ibid. 
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life remained low, especially in the villages. All this did not promote 
 
the strengthening of the country’s moral climate.‛67 
 
 
 
As   for   the   numbers,  according   to   Filippov,  786   000   people   were 
condemned to death from 1925 to 1953. In fact, even today it is hard to estimate 
how  many died, because historians have found it difficult if not impossible to 
gain access  to  the secret police archives. The estimates of Terror victims killed 
range from 3  million  to more than 20 million. Interestingly enough, one more 
history textbook came up with the same number for Stalin’s victims. Dmitrienko’s 
History of the Fatherland states that 786 000 people were sentenced to death, and 
from 1930 to 1953 a total of 18 million people were sent to labour camps.68 
 
 
 
But unlike these manuals, the other textbooks talk about collectivization, 
repressions and deportations: 
 
 
 
‚Stalin  proclaimed  the  necessity  of  destroying  kulaks  as  a  social 
group altogether< Historians estimate that 10 to 15 million peasants 
were shot, deported or lost their property. ‚69 
 
 
‚The  1930s became the darkest page in Russian history< Almost all 
of the Bolshevik’s previous political opponents *the Mensheviks and 
the   Socialist  Revolutionaries]  were  killed  or  sent  to  the  prison 
 
 
67  Ibid. 
68   V. P. Dmitrienko, Istoriia Otechestva - XX vek. Moscow, Drofa, 1999, p. 242. 
69   L. Piatnitskii, Istoriia Rossii, XX vek, Moskva, Moskovskii Litsei, 1999, p. 149. 
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camps< 40 000 Red Army officers were repressed< In the 1930s the 
 
‘population’ of the GULag amounted from 4.5 million to 12 million 
 
people< In Ukraine 300 000 people were arrested and deported by 
 
1950< In the Baltics, 400 000 Lithuanians, 150 000 Latvians and 50 000 
 
Estonians were displaced<‛70 
 
 
 
Zagladin’s 2006 textbook reveals that in the post-war period alone, 6.5 
million people were repressed. The author suggests, however, that these numbers 
can be justified by the Cold War context.71 
 
 
 
We should mention that once it was published, Filippov’s textbook was 
harshly criticized by historians, teachers and the general public, but it should be 
noted, that  some  of the passages and phrases that were the most controversial 
were later edited and watered down, such as the phrase describing Stalin as an 
‚effective  manager.‛72  Still today, Filippov’s text remains among a dozen or so 
 
approved texts for history classes in school. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70   A. Danilov and L. Kosulina, Istoriia Rossii: XX vek, Moscow, Prosveshchenie , 1998., pp. 
178-185, 262-265. 
71  N. Zagladin and al., Istoriia Otechestva: XX vek, Moscow, Russkoe Slovo, 2006, p. 238. 
72 Miguel Vázquez, Liñán, ‚History as a propaganda tool in Putin’s Russia,‛ Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 43, no. 2 (2010), p. 174. 
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Post-Communist Russia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The other event, described briefly in history textbooks, is the storming of 
the Parliament House (also referred to as the White House) on 4 October, 1993. It 
was staged by the members of the Upper House, who opposed Yeltsin’s dismissal 
of  the  entire  government  –  the  House  of  Representatives  (Deputaty)  and  the 
Upper House (Verkhovnii Sovet): 
 
 
 
‚The  Speaker (of the Upper House) Khasbulatov, and the majority 
members of the Constitutional Court declared the President’s actions 
unconstitutional  and  relieved  him  of  his  duties.  Vice-President 
Rutskoi   assumed   the   office   of   President   and   commenced   the 
formation of the parallel government<President Yeltsin issued his 
ultimatum (to the opposition) to leave the ‘White House’ before 4 
October< 
 
 
 
On   October   4,   the   ‘White   House’   was   subjected   to   artillery 
bombardment, which resulted in catastrophic fire and death. In the 
end  the building was occupied by the army and the leaders of the 
opposition were arrested.‛73 
 
 
 
 
 
73  Joseph Zajda, J., The Politics of Rewriting History: New School History Textbooks in Russia, 
In Joseph Zajda (Ed.), The International Handbook of Globalization and Education Policy 
Research., Dordrecht, Springer, 2005. 
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According to historian Joseph Zajda, ‚< the students are not told that this 
incident  was  far  more  serious  than  we  are  lead  to  believe.  Furthermore,  the 
students are not likely to know the full story of this tragic event, and other yet to 
be disclosed excesses of the ancient regime. More people were killed during the 
October 1993 ‘crisis’ then during the storming of the Winter Palace back in 1917. 
This event became another form of ‘characteristic amnesia’.‛74 
 
 
In 2010, academics Jim Butterfield and Ekaterina Levintova conducted a 
study of 47 Russian history textbooks. They limited their study to textbooks that 
are officially approved and used as part of the national curriculum (The Ministry 
of Education of the Russian Federation compiles an annual list, the Federal Set, of 
textbooks that are officially approved by the Russian government75). 
 
 
 
Levintova and Butterfield noted in their study that, when the 1990s and 
the Yeltsin presidency were compared with 2000s and the Putin government, that 
‚by all measures, the latter was portrayed as substantially better.‛76  The 1990s are 
 
 
 
74  Ibid. 
75  For example, Приказ Министерства образования и науки РФ №379 от 9 декабря 2008 
г. 
"Об утверждении федеральных перечней учебников, рекомендованных (допущенных) к 
использованию в образовательном процессе в образовательных учреждениях, реализующих 
образовательные программы общего образования и имеющих государственную 
аккредитацию, на 2009/2010 учебный год (Act №379 on 9 December, 2008 recommends 
textbooks for the 2009-2010 school year). 
76       Ekaterina   Levintova   and   Jim   Butterfield,   ‚History    education   and    
historical 
remembrance  in  contemporary  Russia:  Sources  of  political  attitudes  of  pro-  Kremlin 
youth,‛ Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 43, no. 2 (2010), p. 144. 
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portrayed as a controversial period full of uneven growth and development and 
challenges  to  Russia’s  territorial  integrity,  economic  turbulence,  questionable 
political  stability, and societal tensions. The first Chechen War is described in 
school textbooks  as ‚a disgrace for Russia, its president, and its military,‛  ‚the 
most difficult trial,‛ and ‚the national tragedy, the biggest, since the Afghan war 
mistake  by  the  country’s  leadership.‛  Overall, the  1990s revealed a lack  of a 
‚national idea or ideology that could unite the government and people.‛  With 
Vladimir   Putin   as   Russia’s   president,  economic   conditions   improved   and 
textbook   descriptions  of  the  period  mostly  praised  Putin’s  leadership.  In 
textbooks that compared the Putin and Yeltsin periods, the critique of the Yeltsin 
era was even more critical than in earlier textbooks. At the same time, Levintova 
and Butterfield noted, that when textbooks presented criticisms against the Putin 
government, the critiques were often minor or made before other comments that 
would then praise Putin. 
 
 
 
Indeed, in the 2006 textbook by Zagladin more than twenty pages are 
consecrated  to  the  ‚new  stage  in  Russia’s  development.  The  situation  in 
Chechnya is described in a couple of lines. At the same time, twenty something 
pages talk about Russia’s rapid development, professional army, and high rates 
of the Gross  Domestic Product, quality of life and science development in the 
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twenty-first  century. 77   The  events  of  the  last  decade  of  the  XXth   century  are 
mentioned very briefly in the textbook. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We have seen that while textbooks in the 1990s under Yeltsin allowed for 
a plurality of opinions, textbooks under Putin and Medvedev have consolidated 
around a central government narrative of patriotism. Russian school texts stress 
the importance of a ‚personal perspective‛ on Soviet history: 
 
 
‚We  have attempted to depict the specifics of history as a humanistic 
discipline  to  be  viewed  through  a  personal  perspective.  For  this 
reason there in no need to be afraid of incorrect answers<Questions 
are  designed for discussions during lessons and do not require the 
singular ‘correct’ answer. It is not the answer to the question that is 
important but rather the importance of the question that leads you 
into other questions and reflection.‛78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77  N. Zagladin and al. Istoriia Otechestva: XX vek. Moscow, Russkoe Slovo, 2006, pp. 355- 
385. 
 
78   I. Mishina  and  L.  Zharova,  Istoriia Otechestva.,  Moscow,  Russkoe  Slovo,  1999,  p.  
3. Translated by Joseph Zajda. 
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Readers  are  encouraged  to  use  an  individual,  critical  and  analytical 
approach to history, to ask questions and look for answers: 
 
 
‚Do   you  engage  in  arguments  with  your  family,  and  friends 
concerning Russia’s future development? What is dominating during 
such discussions: arguments or emotions? Do you believe that your 
generation is likely to play a crucial role in the political, economic and 
moral and spiritual rebirth of Russia?‛79 
 
 
The textbooks of the nineties tend to have an anti-Communist tone, they 
shed  light  on  Stalin’s  repressions,  injustices,  difficult  social  climate,  national 
politics, but  do not mention Romanov’s execution. School history textbooks of 
the 2000s emphasise the historical greatness of the Russian State. Soviet Union is 
displayed as a super power, Stalin’s crimes are justified, and Stalin is compared 
to  the  great  Russian leaders:  Catherine  the  Great, Peter  the  Great,  and  Piotr 
Stolypin. 
 
 
 
The war is memorialized not as World War II but as the Great Patriotic 
War. In the nineties, the years 1939 – 1941 are downplayed: usually there is no 
mention of an  alliance between the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany, of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop   pact  or  of  any  repressions  against  the  Armed  Forces 
command. However, in the 2000s, these events appear in textbooks, as the Great 
 
79   V.  Denisenko,  V.  Izmozik,  V.  Ostrovskii  and  V.  Startsev,  Istoriia  Otechestva,  
Saint- Petersburg, SpetsLit, 2000, p. 376. Translated by Joseph Zajda. 
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Patriotic War continues to remain a rallying point in Russian history. There is also 
 
an attempt to teach the love of one’s country through the study of history: 
 
 
 
 
‚Knowing  the history  of  one’s  Motherland  is  important  for  every 
human being. History is correctly called the people’s memory and the 
teacher of life<The  most important thing in the study of history of 
one’s Motherland—is learning to love her. To love the Fatherland 
means to love the country, the geographic space where a person was 
born.  To  love  the  Fatherland  means  loving  one’s  people,  norms, 
customs, culture and native tongue.‛80 
 
 
 
The  politicians  of  the  nineties  did  not  know  how  to  approach  Soviet 
history. And it is obvious, that the Russian government today is still trying to 
fight off  certain images of the Soviet past while at the  same  time embracing 
others,  especially  the Soviet victory in WWII. Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, history  has become an important instrument in building a new Russian 
national identity in the post-Soviet world and creating an image of a once again 
strong  and  powerful  state.  Consequently,  in  the  2000s,  theories  of  Russia’s 
historical uniqueness were reintroduced as an antidote to the post-Soviet senses 
of guilt and humiliation of the nineties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80  A. Preobrazhenski and B. Rybakov, Istoriia Otechestva, Moscow,  Prosveshchenie,  2001, 
pp. 5-6. Translated by Joseph Zajda. 
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Chapter II 
 
Search for a New National Identity in Ukraine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers 
in Pakistan are to heroin addicts: we supply the 
essential raw materials for the market.”81 
 
Eric Hobsbawm, historian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Consolidation, Languages and Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National  consolidation  is  one  of  the  first  priorities  of  new  states.  By 
educating  young  people  in  the  national  language,  especially  when  teaching 
history  and culture, the politicians of new states expect to strengthen national 
unity and patriotism, and abate divisions in the society. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, several countries of the ex-USSR modified school curricula and 
altered the language of instruction. In Ukraine a number of measures were taken 
to limit the use of Russian and to make Ukrainian the main language of public 
 
 
 
 
81   Eric Hobsbawm, ‚Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe,‛Anthropology Today, vol. 8, no. 3 
(1992). 
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spheres.  Even  Russian-speaking  Ukrainians  were  encouraged  to  study  in  the 
national  language. As we will discuss further, Ukraine had undergone several 
language reforms over the centuries. At first, under Peter the Great and Catherine 
the Great  Ukrainian language lost its status of the national language. Later, in 
1876, an imperial decree issued by Tsar Alexander II of Russia prohibited printing 
 
and importing of Ukrainian books. And in the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the Bolsheviks’ attempt at the policy of korenizatsiia or nativization reintroduced 
promotion  of  native  cadres,  languages  and  culture  in  Ukraine.  This  attempt, 
however, was short-lived in ineffective. 
 
 
 
All these years geo-historical division of Ukraine made the situation even 
more  complicated: contemporary Ukraine is made up of several large regions, 
each having a history of its own. Galicia, Transcarpathia, Poltava, the Crimea, the 
Donets Basin, Kiev,  Kharkov, Odessa, Lvov, Sevastopol82  – all these and many 
other regions and cities of Ukraine have different histories and sometimes even 
languages. In fact, there are three major linguistic groups in Ukraine: Ukrainian- 
speaking Ukrainians in the West, Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the East, and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82  See map of Ukraine in Maps. 
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Russians  concentrated  mainly  in  the  North,  East  and  South.  However,  it  is 
important to mention that the majority of the population is bilingual.83 
 
 
 
After   becoming   an   independent   State   in   1991,   Ukraine   conducted 
profound economic, political, cultural and educational reforms. The aim was to 
create   a   society   with   distinctly   developed   national   identity   and   culture. 
According to  the historian Tetyana Koshmanova, in Ukraine ‚< identity is a 
sense of who you are  and where you are from – is commonly understood as a 
highly  developed  level  of  nationalistic  consciousness:  the  Ukrainian  speaking 
majority who stand for the dominant Ukrainian culture, traditions and welcomes 
Catholic or Orthodox religion.‛84  In the nineties a new Ukrainian identity was 
required to replace the Soviet identity,  which was no longer valid for the state 
and was unable to unify the society. 
 
 
 
We have  discussed  in  chapter  I  that  through  education  (especially  in 
 
history, languages, literature, civic education and culture) the state attempts ‚to 
 
root national identity in the past and nurture youngsters in a historical narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83    Tetyana  Koshmanova,  ‚National   Identity  and  Cultural  Coherence  in  Educational 
Reform for Democratic Citizenship,‛  Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, vol. 1, no. 1 
(2006), p. 108. 
84   Ibid., p. 107. 
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that  legitimizes  state  independence  and  the  cultural  politics  of  the  state‛. 85 
 
Indeed, in Ukraine, the first reforms aimed to create a new national identity for all 
 
Ukrainian citizens as well as to democratize the out-dated educational system.86 
 
The new recipes for national identities were not original. They involved inventing 
 
‚deep  historic, even pre-historic roots for a people, fashioning new historical 
heroes,  constructing versions of history that stress glory and achievement,‛87   as 
well as introducing a common foreign enemy. 
 
 
 
National Identity and the Orange Revolution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Orange Revolution of 2004 revealed an existing conflict between the 
Russian-speaking East and Ukrainian-speaking West of the country.88  The 2004 
pre-election campaigns included anti-Russian and anti-minorities contents. The 
country was split into two. ‚The Orange Revolution fuelled transformation and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85   Jan Germent Janmaat, ‚The Ethnic ‘Other’ in Ukrainian History Textbooks: the Case 
of 
Russia and the Russians,‛ Compare, vol. 37, no. 3 (June 2007), p. 308. 
86  For the modern-day Educational system in Ukraine, see Figure 
2. 
87   Tatyana Volodina, ‚Teaching  History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR,‛  The 
History Teacher, vol. 38, no. 2 (February, 2005), p. 184. 
88   For more information on the Orange Revolution see Andrew Wilson’s Ukraine’s Orange 
Revolution (2005), Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul’s Revolution in Orange: the Origins of 
Ukrain’s democratic breakthrough (2006), or again, Paul D’Anieri’s Orange  Revolution and 
Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine (2010). 
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originated  a  new  social  phenomenon  –  European  identity  in  Ukraine.‛ 89   For 
 
Ukraine Europe was becoming a model for the future development. 
 
 
 
 
In post-Soviet Ukraine, attempts to revise history have been polarizing 
and  contradictory. Still today, Ukraine does not have an official or prevailing 
concept of its national history, mostly because, as we have explained earlier, of its 
geographical, historical and linguistic attributes. 
 
 
 
According to the historian Jan Germen Janmaat, ‚an important aspect of 
history education in Ukraine is the treatment of ethnic others.‛90   He stresses that 
usually, in  history textbooks harmful effects of contact with ‚ethnic  others‛ are 
highlighted whereas positive results are downplayed or omitted.91  He continues 
on to suggest that there are four functions of this negative stereotyping: first, it 
distinguishes the ‚in- from  the out-group.‛  Second, by stressing the hostility of 
the  out-group,  it  conceals   conflicts  within  the  in-group.  Third,  it  provides 
justification for a ‚liberation struggle against a foreign ‘oppressor’‛, justifying at 
once the establishment and consolidation of an independent state.  And finally, it 
acquits the leaders of a newly independent state from the past and from their 
 
 
89    Tetyana  Koshmanova,  ‚National   Identity  and  Cultural  Coherence  in  Educational 
Reform for Democratic Citizenship,‛  Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, vol. 1, no. 1 
(2006), p. 111. 
90  Jan Germent Janmaat, ‚The Ethnic ‘Other’ in Ukrainian History Textbooks: the Case of 
Russia and the Russians,‛ Compare, vol. 37, no. 3 (June 2007), p. 308. 
91  Ibid. 
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previous actions.92  In the same way, some Ukrainian historians today explain the 
country’s history like this: ‚Ukraine was created by God who worked through the 
hands  of  our enemies‛.93  For Ukraine it was easy to find an acceptable ‘ethnic 
other’: Russia and the Russians became an obvious choice. 
 
 
 
Teaching History in Ukraine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like their Soviet predecessors, post-Soviet public schools usually take a 
strictly  chronological approach to the teaching of history. Starting in the fifth 
grade, when  the  children are approximately ten - eleven years old, they begin 
with Ancient Greece  and Rome and continue on until they finish the eleventh 
grade (when they are sixteen - seventeen years old) in contemporary times. In the 
2000s they are taught a ‚condensed‛ version of history of Soviet Ukraine, much 
like the one that can be found in the Soviet textbooks on the history of Ukraine, 
and which almost never mentioned developments in Ukrainian language, culture, 
and social life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92   Ibid. 
93   Citation from Medvedev, Roy, ‚History and Myth,‛ Russia in Global Affaires, vol. 4, no. 3 
(July-September 2006), p. 172. 
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In the 1980s, the Soviet authorities only allowed ‘History of Ukraine’ to be 
taught  as  an  ‘additional’  subject.  However,  in  light  of  continuous  calls  for  a 
reappraisal of historical events in the late 1980s, the former Ukrainian Communist 
leadership was forced to reconsider the approach. Following this, a programme 
was initiated to develop  historical research in Ukraine, which led to a single 
‘History of Ukraine’ course being introduced in schools by 1989-1990.94  At the 
 
same time,  the  name  of  the  publishing  house,  responsible  for  school  history 
textbooks was transformed from Radyans’ka Shkola (The Soviet School) to Osvita 
(Education). By the mid-1990s, Osvita was joined by a second publishing house, 
Geneza, although both continued publishing work of the same historians.95 
 
 
 
Still, in the 1990s, because of the economic crisis, there was a shortage in 
the  new Ukrainian language history textbooks. The first history textbooks to be 
revised  were  the  texts  for  the  fifth  and  eleventh  grades.  But,  because  of  the 
difficult  financial  situation,  neither government, nor  the  schools were  able  to 
afford to buy  the  new books.  Moreover, sometimes, even the revised history 
textbooks would still  make the use of the ‚Soviet  language‛  and concepts. But 
later, more and more authors would break with the Soviet version of the History 
 
 
 
 
 
94 Peter W. Rodgers, ‚Compliance or Contradiction? Teaching ‘History’ in the ‘New’ 
Ukraine. A View from Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands.‛  Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 59, no. 3 
(May 2007), p. 507. 
95  Ibid. 
56 
 
 
 
 
of Ukraine and alter historical interpretations to fit the political and ideological 
shifts of statehood. 
 
 
 
Russian  researchers  Lyudmila  Moiseyenkova  and  Pavel  Martsinovsky 
came to the same conclusion, after they studied and analyzed about 20 textbooks 
on the history of Ukraine, issued in 1995-2002 in various Ukrainian cities in the 
Russian and Ukrainian languages.96  They concluded: 
 
 
 
‚We   see  that  Russia,  and  everything  related  to  it,  is  depicted  in 
Ukrainian school textbooks as the source of the historical tragedy of 
the Ukrainian people, as the center of evil and Asiatic insidiousness. 
Relations between Ukraine and Russia are described as continuous 
confrontation,  sometimes  even  military  confrontation.  Throughout 
their history the Ukrainians are portrayed as fighters for 
independence. The Ukrainian people had overcome all hardships, 
survived and preserved their culture and individuality despite the 
difficult occupation by the Russian/Soviet Empire; they have not lost 
their aspirations for freedom, independence and statehood.‛ 
 
 
 
The researchers went on to say: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96   Liudmila Moiseenkova and Pavel Martsinovskii, ‚Rossiia  v Ukrainskikh uchebnikakh 
istorii: novoe videnie ili proiavlenie konkurentsii na ideologicheskom rynke? Vzgliad iz 
Kryma,‛ Skepsis Online Journal,  http://scepsis.ru/library/id_2169.html, consulted on 4 May, 
2011. 
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‚The  main objective of the authors of these textbooks is to eliminate 
 
the students’ perception that Ukrainian history is a part of Russian 
history: this connection never existed in the past, and will not exist in 
the future.‛97 
 
 
 
In order to agree or disagree with their conclusion, we will conduct a 
study  of  Ukrainian  school  textbooks  and  will  determine  whether  Ukrainian 
representation  of the Soviet period is impartial or whether Ukraine’s history is 
only presented through the continuous struggle with Russia and the Russians. 
 
 
 
From Kievan Rus’ to being a Part of the Russian Empire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The   three   eastern   Slavic   nations,   Ukraine,   Belorussia   and   Russia 
originated in Kievan Rus’. Kievan Rus’ included nearly all of present-day Ukraine 
and Belarus and part of Northwestern European Russia, extending as far north as 
Novgorod and Vladimir. At the time of the christening of Kievan Rus’ in the tenth 
century98,  differences among the tribes that later evolved into separate nations 
were not great.99  But the Tatar invasion of the early thirteenth century began the 
historical, cultural and ideological split between these territorial entities. At first, 
the lands of present-day Ukraine and Belarus were controlled by the Lithuanians. 
 
 
97   Translated by Roy Medvedev. 
98   In year 988. 
99   Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Lost Empire, Armonk, London, M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 21. 
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In the fourteenth century Lithuania joined Poland and accepted Christianity100. 
Later,  in  the sixteenth century, Ukraine came under Polish rule, while Belarus 
remained    with   Lithuania   until   the   dissolution   of   the   Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth  in  1795.  The  Muscovite  Russia,  on the  other hand, remained 
under Tatar domination for  centuries while Ukraine and Belorussia enjoyed the 
relative freedom in the Polish-Lithuanian State. 
 
 
 
 
 
This period and its importance to the origins of the Ukrainian and Russian 
nations    are   still   highly   contested   across   Russia   and   Ukraine. 101       Soviet 
historiography defined this period as the beginning of Russian state, Kiev being 
the ‘mother of Russian cities’. In Ukraine, however, numerous attempts have been 
made  since  1991  to   legitimize   Kievan  Rus’  as  essentially  ‚proto-Ukrainian 
state‛.102 
 
 
 
 
 
In the fifteenth century, after gaining freedom from Mongol invasion, the 
 
Grand Duchy of Moscow sought to expand its territory. At the same time, the 
 
Ukrainian  road  to  nationhood  and  independence  began  in  the  borderlands 
 
 
 
100   Christianization of Lithuania began in 1387. 
101  Peter W. Rodgers, ‚Compliance  or Contradiction? Teaching ‘History’ in the  ‘New’ 
Ukraine. A View from Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands.‛  Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 59, no. 3 
(May 2007), pp. 509. 
102  Ibid. 
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between Poland, Russia, and Crimea – often in under populated areas: as the 
Tatars  retreated, the liberated territories were resettled by Cossacks. Cossacks 
were the free  men, who lived in the steppes, acknowledged no authority and 
practiced various trades while living off hunting, fishing, and armed forays. 
 
 
 
 
 
The history of the Ukrainian Cossacks had three distinct aspects: at first, 
their struggle against the Tatars and the Turks in the steppe allowed them to take 
control over the territories, become stronger and more numerous, start tilling the 
land. Second, their  support of the Ukrainian people in their fight against the 
power of the Polish  magnates, contributed to the building of the autonomous 
Ukrainian  state.  It  was  during  the  seventeenth  century  wars,  carried  by  the 
Cossacks  against  the  Polish  state  that  Ukrainian  national  consciousness  first 
emerged.   The   Cossacks   unified   the   population   under   hetman 103      Bohdan 
Khmelnytsky  in  fighting  the  Poles.  However,  Khmelnitsky’s  decision  to  seek 
Moscow`s support and protection against  Warsaw sealed the fate of Ukraine. 
Instead of remaining under control of weak Polish states in a decentralized and 
therefore somewhat tolerant state, the Cossacks soon found themselves subjects 
of the Russian autocracy.104 
 
 
 
 
103   Hetman (гетьман) – the title used by Ukraine`s Cossacks from the sixteenth century. 
The highest military office, the head of state. 
104   Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Lost Empire, Armonk, London, M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 22. 
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At the  beginning, Moscow tolerated Cossack liberties and their strong 
desire of independence, but soon it began to tighten its hold on Eastern Ukraine: 
serfdom was  reaffirmed; hetman was no longer elected but appointed. Russian 
nobles were given land grants at Cossacks’ expense. They were almost broken by 
Tsar Peter the Great, then resettled further to the east by Catherine the Great and 
reduced to being the ‚instruments of Russia’s colonial expansion‛. New Cossack 
territorial army units were created in the North Caucasus, the Urals and Siberia. 
After the fall of Crimea and the removal of the Cossacks, Ukrainian lands became 
provinces of  the  Russian empire; Ukrainians were  no  longer considered  as a 
separate nationality and were referred to as ‚Little Russians‛. 105 
 
 
 
 
 
The elimination of the semi-autonomous Cossack state by Catherine the 
Great in 1775 is an important event in Ukrainian historiography. It is often used 
by  the  Ukrainian  authors  to  describe  the  first  steps  of  Russia’s  government 
toward  total  subjugation  of  the  Ukrainian  people  to  Russian rule  which was 
achieved by the reinstatement of serfdom and a retreat of the Ukrainian language 
from public  affairs.  It  is  often  stressed,  that while  the  Russian language  was 
becoming  dominant   in  the  region,   Ukrainian   lost  its  attraction  and   was 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105  Ibid. 
61 
 
 
 
 
considered a dialect, thing of a past, appropriate only for peasant chatter, old 
 
songs and other manifestation of Ukraine’s cultural past. 106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While this historical period is not analyzed in this work, however, it is 
important to mention that these events are vividly described in Ukrainian history 
textbooks. They stress that the conditions of Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks 
worsened under Catherine’s rule and often meant the imposition of taxes, the re- 
introduction of labour duties, harsh regulations tying peasants to the land and 
unreasonable language policies. Also, for the first time, the history of Ukraine is 
presented in the textbooks as the history of opposition to the foreign power. 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1876, the Ems Ukaz, an imperial decree, issued by Tsar Alexander II of 
Russia  banned the use of Ukrainian language in print with the exception of re- 
printing the old historical documents. Despite this, during the nineteenth century, 
Ukraine   experienced   a   national-cultural   awakening.   Ukrainian   poet   Taras 
Shevchenko’s works  contributed to the revival of the Ukrainian language and 
culture and became the  embodiment of what was understood as the Ukrainian 
national revival. His writings became the foundation for the modern Ukrainian 
 
 
 
106  Jan Germent Janmaat, ‚The Ethnic ‘Other’ in Ukrainian History Textbooks: the Case of 
Russia and the Russians,‛ Compare, vol. 37, no. 3 (June 2007), p. 313. 
62 
 
 
 
 
literature. Ukrainian historiography appeared, stressing the separate path from 
 
the Russian history and condemning ‚Russian historical imperialism‛.107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ukraine  remained  incorporated  in  Russia  for  centuries.  But  while  the 
western third of the Ukrainian ethnic lands remained at first under Polish, then 
Austro-Hungarian,  and  then  again  Polish  rule  until  1939;  eastern  Ukrainians 
experienced the process of nation-building within the Russian Empire. During 
these years, many state and cultural leaders of Ukrainian independence carefully 
preserved  Ukrainian  collective  histories  in  hope  of  one  day  bringing  people 
together, to foster solidarity, give people sense of home and belonging. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107  Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Lost Empire, Armonk, London, M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 23. 
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From Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It  has  to  be  said  that  historians  in  Ukraine  devote  very  little 
attention to the history of their lands when they were part of the Russian Empire. 
Instead, they focus on the events of 1917-1920 when a sovereign Ukrainian state – 
the Ukrainian People’s Republic – which was established and later attacked and 
destroyed by the Bolsheviks. 
 
 
 
When  talking  about  the  Revolution  of  1905-1907,  they  usually  put 
emphasis   on   its   uniquely   Russian  character.   According   to   the   Ukrainian 
historians, the Revolution originated in Russia’s capital, but had an impact on 
some of Ukraine’s regions: 
 
 
 
‚This Revolution was a consequence of Russia’s development. Tsarist 
regime’s apathy and inaction made this Revolution inevitable. It was 
so  in the centre, but also in Russia’s provinces, as for example in 
Ukrainian Podneprovskaia region. ‛108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108  Fedir Grigorovich Turchenko and V. M. Moroko, Istoriia Ukraini (kinets XVII - pochatok 
XX st.): pidruchnik dlia 9 kl. sered. zagal’nosvit. shk., Kiev, Geneza, 2003, p. 331. 
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The two authors then proceed to describe the national struggle for liberation from 
 
Russia’s political oppression: 
 
 
 
 
‚In 1905, the national struggle for liberation in Ukraine was almost 
unnoticeable. In this difficult context, Ukrainian politicians could not 
decide whether they should join Russian political parties and hope 
that  later  on  their  national  interests  would  not  be  forgotten,  or 
whether  they should follow their distinct path<Ukrainian  Deputies 
were  suggesting  the  transformation  of  the  Russian  Empire  into 
Federal State, then Ukraine would become an autonomic State with 
its own government< Large numbers of people, especially Ukrainian 
peasants, made the achievements of the national liberation movement 
possible.‛ 109 
 
 
 
The 1917 Revolution and the establishment of Bolshevik rule in the early 
 
1920s are  described  as particularly  traumatic events in Ukrainian history.  The 
books  discuss the Bolsheviks’ engagement in a struggle with the Central Rada110 
and argue that  the latter was the only legitimate political body representing the 
Ukrainian nation.  The Bolsheviks are shown as a foreign power that imposed its 
rule on Ukraine against its wishes: 
 
 
‚Four  times the Central Rada attempted to gain national 
independence.   But in the beginning of XXth century it was made 
 
 
109  Ibid., p. 351-352. 
110  A Ukrainian parliament created in March 1917. 
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impossible. In December 1917 – February 1918, Rada lost control over 
 
the biggest part of Ukraine. Well-coordinated actions conducted by 
 
the Red Army and the Bolsheviks defeated the Revolution.‛111 
 
 
 
Turchenko’s  textbook  also  points  out  that  the Bolsheviks  used  force  to 
establish power. The author accuses them of eliminating democracy, persecuting 
Ukrainian  traditions  and  culture,  pillaging  and  terrorizing  the  population.  He 
argues that their actions only provoked more resistance: 
 
 
 
‚The  establishment of Bolshevik power in Ukraine, by means of deceit, 
violence and direct interference from abroad, inevitably had to become 
and became the object of nationwide opposition.‛112 
 
 
 
Other  textbooks  (Kul’chitskii  and  Shapoval)  present  a  more  cautious 
account  of  these  events.  They  note  that  the  Bolsheviks  became  very  popular 
because   of  their  slogans  calling  for  an  immediate  end  to  the  war  and  an 
unconditional handover of land to the peasants. Still, the undemocratic nature of 
Bolshevism is highlighted and it is suggested that the revolutionaries only adopted 
populist slogans to gain followers and to organize a successful coup d’état.113 
 
 
 
 
111   Fedir Grigorovich Turchenko, Novitnia istoriia Ukraini. 10 klas: pidruchnik dlia 10 kl. sered. 
zagal’nosvit. shk., Kiev, Geneza, 2004, p. 104. 
112   Fedir  Grigorovich  Turchenko  and  Nadiia  Kostiantinivna  Kosmina,  Novitnia istoriia 
Ukraini. 11 klas: Didaktichni materiali (tematichni testi) do pidruchnikiv F. G. Turchenka ta in. 
1998-200 rr. vidannia,  Zaporozhzhia, Prosvita, 2001, p. 97. 
113   Stanislav Vladislavovich  Kul’chitskii  and  Iurii  Ivanovich  Shapoval,  Novitnia istoriia 
Ukraini (1914-1939): Pidruchnik dlia 10 kl. zagal’nosvit. navch. zakl., Kiev, Geneza, 2003, p. 69. 
66 
 
 
 
 
The textbooks say little about the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist   Republic  within  the  Soviet  Union.  According  to  Turchenko’s  2004 
textbook, it was a result of continuous ‚aggression‛ from Soviet Russia: 
 
 
 
‚The  Bolsheviks captured Ukraine very fast< When the Bolsheviks 
returned to Ukraine for the third time, they did everything in order to 
assure their lasting control  over the territory<  As previously, the 
political line for Ukraine was developed in Moscow and represented 
the   interests   of   the   Bolsheviks.   These   interests   demanded   the 
unification of Ukraine, which had to follow Russia’s pre-established 
rules and norms< The party line of the CP*b+U114     ignored Ukrainian 
language and Ukraine’s national culture<115 
 
 
 
 
Later, during the post-revolutionary years Ukraine witnessed 
unprecedented terror during the Civil war, and then lived through a short period 
of  recovery  under  Lenin’s  New  Economic  Policy.  An  attempt  at  a  policy  of 
korenizatsiia or nativization followed and for a short time allowed Ukrainians claim 
even more leadership positions and promoted national languages and culture. But 
the  Stalin era  brought  in  Ukraine  ruthless  campaign  of  collectivisation,  which 
meant deportation for many kulaks (more prosperous peasant families), purges and 
famine. 
 
 
 
114  Communist Party (the Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. 
115  Fedir Grigorovich Turchenko, Novitnia istoriia Ukraini. 10 klas: pidruchnik dlia 10 kl. sered. 
zagal’nosvit. shk., Kiev, Geneza, 2004, pp. 154-155, 175. 
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Holodomor –Genocide of Ukrainian People? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion of the Famine was first included in the Soviet editions of the 
textbook in the late 1980’s.116  It was a part of a new policy of glasnost’, which we 
have talked about earlier, an effort to fill in the blank spots of history.  The overall 
tone  of  the  texts  was  forthright  and  unapologetic.  Amid  a  discussion  of  the 
‚collectivization   of  rural  agriculture‛  there  was  a  detailed  description  of  the 
 
various decrees of the time. It was explained when they were signed and why. The 
first attempts to estimate the number of victims were made as well. 
 
 
 
An issue of responsibility for the outcomes inflicted by the Famine was a 
critical  factor in approaching this historical period. For a while it seemed like it 
was resolved by putting the entire blame on Stalin’s policies and by exonerating 
Party  cadres  because  of  their  powerlessness  to  challenge  Stalin’s  power.  For 
example, one of the texts states: 
 
 
 
‚Party,  Soviet and agricultural workers who stopped storing bread 
 
saw the tragedy of the situation with their own eyes. Most of them 
 
 
 
 
 
116   Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine, The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1998, p. 95. 
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were  no  more  than  a  small  screw  in  a  state  machine  without  a 
 
soul.‛117 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, many of the Party officials were aware of the ongoing tragedy in 
the  1930. Some even witnessed and documented the widespread starvation and 
sufferings. They tried to protest against the policies, but were accused of sabotage 
and eventually lost  their positions and were persecuted. However, it is obvious, 
that for a famine of this scale to occur, many local and high-level officials had to 
participate or at least not to intervene in the application of the policies. 
 
 
 
Both, textbooks of the 1990’s and of the 2000’s state that it was forbidden 
for the peasants to leave their villages (their passports and work documents were 
taken   away   from   them),   regardless   whether   they   surrender   their   grains, 
vegetables, and livestock. Brigades of workers and soldiers were assigned to the 
trains and train stations to search the luggage of the peasants traveling to or from 
the regions hit by the Famine. Usually, the peasants would buy food for very large 
sums of money, after having sold valuable possessions, in effort to delay hunger in 
their families. The provisions found by the brigades would be confiscated and the 
peasants would return home missing both, money and food. The most gruesome 
aspects  of  the  Famine  are  described  as  well.  The  widespread  practice  of 
 
 
 
117   M. V.Koval and al., Istoriia Ukraini, Kyiv, Osvita, 1991, p. 204. Translated by Catherine 
Wanner. 
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abandoning children, the reported cases of cannibalism and the digging up of 
dead bodies for food are often mentioned without any specific commentaries and 
are accompanied by photographs. 
 
 
 
The last Soviet text (Koval and al.) depicts Stalin as neither innocent nor 
ignorant of what was going on in Ukraine thanks to his policies. The text cites his 
speech  to the  All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Workers and Stakhanovites  on 
February 19, 1933, during which he said: 
 
 
 
‚In any event the hardships which our workers endured ten to fifteen 
years ago, compared to those they have today, comrade collective 
workers, seem like children’s toys.‛118 
 
 
The  text  exonerates  local  officials  of  responsibility  and  Stalin  is  held 
responsible for the tragedy: 
 
 
 
‚There is no doubt that millions of peasants were brought to death by 
the cold-blooded decision of Stalin to seize all edible provisions from 
Ukrainian peasants and then to wrap the starving in a veil of silence, 
to forbid them any kind of help from either the international or Soviet 
communities. In order to prevent the arbitrary escape of a huge mass 
 
 
 
 
 
118  M. V. Koval and al., Istoriia Ukraini, Kyiv, Osvita, 1991, p. 204. Translated by Catherine 
Wanner. 
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of starving people beyond the boundaries of the republic, a barrage of 
 
troops were stationed on the borders.‛119 
 
 
 
 
The first post-Soviet textbook, written by the same group of authors in 1992 
extends the description of the Famine by one page. The book goes in greater detail 
on how famine conditions were created and conducted. The new text describes the 
Famine  as  ‚evidence  of  the  barbarism  of  a  totalitarian  state  during  extreme 
conditions  of  economic  catastrophe‛. 120   The  book  does  not  blame  one  person 
anymore; it accuses  both, the state and the existing system for the events of the 
1930’s. 
 
 
 
 
The newer narrative attempts to link high grain requisitions to the rapid 
rise of mortality in the regions. Moreover, the texts detail the scale of confiscations: 
they were not only gathered from the collective farms or kolkhozes, but they were 
forcefully taken away from the peasants themselves. Authors explain: 
 
 
‚Confiscation  was  ordered  as  punishment  for  ‘kulak’  sabotage  of 
grain supplies.‛121 
 
 
 
 
 
119  M. V. Koval and al., Istoriia Ukraini, Kyiv, Osvita, 1991, p. 203. Translated by Catherine 
Wanner. 
120   M.  V.  Koval  and  al.,  Istoriia  Ukraini,  Kyiv,  Raiduha,  1992,  p.  281.  Translated  by 
Catherine Wanner. 
121    M.  V.  Koval  and  al.,  Istoriia  Ukraini,  Kyiv,  Raiduha,  1992,  p.  281.  Translated  by 
Catherine Wanner. 
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In the 1992 textbook we can find a new paragraph on the Soviet practice of 
erasing  history. In fact, this most recent addition to Ukraine’s history textbooks 
reveals that in Soviet historiography numerous attempts had been made to conceal 
the events of the 1930s from the new generations of both, Russia and Ukraine: 
 
 
 
‚Of  that which ended in Ukraine in 1933, not one word made it into 
official documents. The reason was that Stalin ordered the Famine to 
be regarded as a nonexistent phenomenon. Even in the stenographic 
records  of  the  plenary  session  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
Communist   Party   of   Ukraine   the   world   ‚famine‛   was   never 
mentioned during this whole period.‛122 
 
 
 
Once again, the authors not only blame Stalin for what happened in 1932- 
 
1934, but they also suggest that Stalin failed to acknowledge the consequences of 
his own policies and tried to conceal them. 
 
 
 
In general, the first post-Soviet textbooks provide rather expanded version 
of the events than the one that can be found in the Soviet books. While the Soviet 
texts try to put the entire blame on Stalin and his policies, the post-Soviet books 
tend to blame the  entire Soviet system for allowing a tyrant to conduct rather 
unnecessary and fatal reforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
122   Ibid. 
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Today still much is written about the horrible famine in Ukraine in 1933, 
and it  is often depicted only as a ‚Ukrainian famine‛ or, moreover, as genocide 
against  the  Ukrainian  peasants.  Understandably,  the  Ukrainian  textbooks  are 
critical of the role of the Soviet command in these events, arguing that the main 
reason for pursuing the  policy of collectivization was ‚an easy extraction and 
control over resources‛ and that the famine was ‚artificial, being caused by food 
confiscation campaigns rather than  natural events, and that it was a deliberate 
instrument of the authorities to crush the opposition of the Ukrainian peasantry to 
the collectivization drive:‛123 
 
 
 
‚The Soviet regime was successful in conducting economic reforms by 
using force and command. The agrarian way of life in Ukraine was 
destroyed. Ukraine became an industrial country. New large 
manufacturing cities appeared. By the end of the 1930s, one-third of 
the Ukrainians lived in the cities. During the collectivization, millions 
of peasants were displaced.‛124 
 
 
‚The co-existence of communism with the needs for the national 
development  of  Ukraine  proved  to  be  impossible.  Anyone,  who 
would resist or would prove to be an enemy of Stalin’s regime, was 
persecuted   without   pity.   Many   Ukrainians   became   victims   of 
Holodomor in 1932-1933. Ukrainian peasantry and national 
 
 
123   Jan Germent Janmaat, ‚The Ethnic ‘Other’ in Ukrainian History Textbooks: the Case of 
Russia and the Russians,‛ Compare, vol. 37, no. 3 (June 2007), p. 315. 
124  Fedir Grigorovich Turchenko, Novitnia istoriia Ukraini. 10 klas: pidruchnik dlia 10 kl. sered. 
zagal’nosvit. shk., Kiev, Geneza, 2004, p. 327. 
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intelligentsia  were  hit  the  most.  They  felt  the  consequences  of 
 
‚ukrainization‛,  policy,  which  aimed  to  strip  Ukrainians  off  their 
collective memory, to kill their aspirations for independence in their 
everyday life.‛125 
 
 
Turchenko’s text uses harsher tone in describing Stalin’s regime. He also 
argues that the whole Ukrainian nation suffered from these policies, not only the 
peasantry. He  starts his chapter on the Famine with the following statement: 
‚One of the cruellest crimes committed by Stalinism against the Ukrainian nation 
 
was the Famine of 1932-1933.‛126   In the concluding paragraph he writes: 
 
 
 
 
‚The  tragedy of  1932-1933 decisively  crushed the  resistance to  the 
Kolkhoz-feudal system and essentially eliminated the forces that stood 
up  for the vexed national rights. Precisely this is what totalitarian 
regime   aimed  for,  what  its  representatives  in  Ukraine  cynically 
discussed.‛127 
 
 
On one hand, this extract reinforces the idea that the Soviet regime had 
clear  and predetermined plan of suppressing the Ukrainians and of forcefully 
impose on them its will. But on the other hand, the state and party officials are 
 
 
 
125  Ibid. pp. 328-329. 
126   Fedir Grigorovich Turchenko, Novitnia istoriia Ukraini. 10 klas: pidruchnik dlia 10 kl. sered. 
zagal’nosvit. shk., Kiev, Geneza, 2002, p. 279. 
127   Ibid., p. 282. Translated by Jan Germent Janmaat in ‚The  Ethnic ‘Other’ in Ukrainian 
History Textbooks: the Case of Russia and the Russians,‛  Compare, vol. 37, no. 3 (June 
2007), p. 315. 
74 
 
 
 
 
not labeled as ‚ethnic others‛ – Russian or Jews. However, the participation of the 
Ukrainians in the application of the collectivization policies is omitted from the 
textbooks, so the texts leave overall impression that ethnic Ukrainians were the 
victims and never participated in the collectivization campaigns. 
 
 
 
So  what  impact  do  the  new  history  textbook  have  on  teaching  of 
Holodomor period in Ukraine? In 2007, Peter W. Rodgers conducted dozens of 
interviews with Ukrainian history teachers in Eastern Ukraine. He asked them to 
share  their  opinions  regarding  key  events  and  figures  throughout  Ukraine’s 
history and  towards representation of ‘Russia’ in the textbooks. He found that 
Ukrainian teachers would often ‚subtly change the accent or focus away from the 
‘nationalist’ stance toward Russia, as found in the school history textbooks, to a 
 
more  tolerant  stance  which  aims  to  promote  rather  than  negate  Ukraine’s 
historical interactions with Russia.‛128 
 
 
 
Also, in these interviews, teachers shared, that the Holodomor period was 
the  most  difficult  to  teach in school.  Teachers felt  that the  Ukrainian  history 
textbooks  used  a  ‚very  ‘negative’  historical  narrative‛  when  describing  the 
Famine events. Teachers also stated that this period of history was particularly 
 
 
 
128   Peter W. Rodgers, ‚Compliance  or Contradiction? Teaching ‘History’ in the  ‘New’ 
Ukraine. A View from Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands.‛  Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 59, no. 3 
(May 2007), p. 503. 
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difficult to teach because of the on-going debates on the subject. Often, they said, 
it was  hard to talk about something that was still fresh in people’s memories, 
something   that   children   would   question,   after   having   learnt   alternative 
perspectives  of  the  events  from  outside  sources,  from  the  real  witnesses  of 
history, such as their parents or grandparents. 
 
 
 
Many teachers expressed the view that when they received their education 
during  the Soviet period, coverage of this event did not exist at all. But now, 
while they  agree that the lengthy description of the Famine in the books is the 
step in the right direction, they also feel uncomfortable with the use of this event 
by Ukrainian authorities for political purposes. They also seemed to agree that the 
famine was a great example of  the Stalinist regime atrocities, but stressed that 
there was no need to use the rather  ‘nationalist’ approach.129       For example, the 
school director from Luhans’k argued: 
 
 
 
‚Today,  there  are  lots  of  problems  concerning  the  Great  Famine. 
There is an opinion that the famine was caused by the Russians. But 
the   famine  was  ideological.  It  is  written  in  the  textbooks  that 
Moskali130  ruined the Ukrainian people. But here Russians were ruined 
 
 
 
129   Peter W. Rodgers,  ‚Compliance  or Contradiction? Teaching ‘History’  in the  ‘New’ 
Ukraine. A View from Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands.‛  Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 59, no. 3 
(May 2007), p. 511. 
130   Moskal’ – is a historic reference word for Russian, or literally Muscovite (a person from 
Moscow or Muscovy). The name Moskal’ for Muscovite, was coined in Lithuania and 
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themselves, together with Ukrainians; millions of people perished. 
 
The ideology formed this situation. Somebody earned some money 
from this. You know, bread was sold to Europe. Europe bought this 
bread. It is possible to ask a question, why did Europe, knowing we 
had a famine, buy this bread? And we say it was the Russians. I am 
also a Moskal, a Russian, a Don Cossack, therefore should I be kicked 
every year because the famine took place?‛131 
 
 
This  passage  allows  us  to  examine  the  rising  issues  of  nationality  and 
ethnicity in Ukrainian society. In this case, an ethnic Russian, who was born and 
lived his whole life in Ukraine, expresses his views. He feels that the Ukrainian 
state is shifting towards a more ethnic interpretation of history. He feels that he is 
being left out  of  the discussion on this historical period. He thinks that, on the 
basis of his ethnicity,  he is being alienated from the education reform process 
taking place in Ukraine. Therefore, it can be argued that in spite of the state efforts 
to unite rather than divide the  population by offering a new version of Soviet 
history, several language and ethnic minorities cannot find a place for themselves 
in this new system. 
 
 
Poland when the Grand Duchy of Muscovy claimed leadership in Russian affairs, after 
the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols in 1240. The kings and dukes of the Polish- 
Lithuanian commonwealth refused to acknowledge the Russians who were subject to 
Moscow as Russians, maintaining that the only Russians were those that they ruled. 
(Толковый словарь русского языка: В 4 т. Под ред. Д.Н. Ушакова, Москва, Гос. ин-т 
"Сов. энцикл.", ОГИЗ, Гос. изд-во иностр. и нац. слов, 1935-1940.) It is used in several 
Slavic  languages:  Belarusian,  Polish  and  Ukrainian,  today  it is  considered  largely  an 
archaism and an ethnic slur. 
131  Cited in Peter W. Rodgers, ‚Compliance  or Contradiction? Teaching ‘History’ in the 
‘New’ Ukraine. A View from Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands.‛  Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 59, 
no. 3 (May 2007), p. 512. 
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The Second World War or the Great Patriotic War? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another   emotionally   charged   period   for   the   Ukraine’s   population 
perception of history is the Second World War. As we explained in chapter I, the 
Russian textbooks usually discuss in great detail the last five years of the war and 
refer to it as  the  ‘Great Patriotic War’. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
numerous attempts have been made to move away from the Soviet conception of 
this period and to simply approach it as World War II. However, the Red Army’s 
victory over fascism, the massive  devastation of the lands and suffering of the 
Soviet people during this war became a grand myth of patriotism, sacrifice and 
heroism which supported the idea of greatness of Soviet and, later, of Ukrainian 
people. 
 
 
 
Not all Ukrainian authors use the term ‚Great Patriotic War‛. Kul’chitskii 
and Shapoval call it the ‚Soviet-German War‛.132  Moreover, a book by Burakov, 
Kiparenko  and  Movchan  states  that  the  World  War  II  was  a  direct  result  of 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and both, Germany and the USSR, were to blame: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132   Stanislav  Vladislavovich  Kul’chitskii  and  Iurii  Ivanovich  Shapoval,  Novitnia istoriia 
Ukraini (1939-2001): Pidruchnik dlia 11 kl. zagal’nosvit. navch. zakl. Kiev, Geneza, 2005, p. 23. 
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‚In  order  to  instigate  the  beginning  of  the  war  between  western 
 
countries, the Soviet command refused to begin political negotiation 
with  Great  Britain  and  France  in  1939  and  went  on  to  sign  the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Germany, which would divide Eastern 
Europe  into  spheres  of  influence.  By  doing  so,  the  Soviet  Union 
changed the balance of power in Europe in favour of Germany and its 
allies.  The   first  victim  of   Hitler’s  and  Stalin’s   agreement   was 
Poland.‛133 
 
 
 
Then, at the end of the chapter, the students are asked to answer the following 
questions: 
 
 
 
‚How  did  the  Soviet  command  succeed  in  signing  the  Molotov- 
Ribbentrop pact  in the beginning of  war?  Why the  actions of  the 
Soviet  command  were  detrimental  to  the  national  interests  of  the 
other countries and to Russia’s people in particular? What would you 
call   a  country,  which  signed  a  pact  for  collaboration  with  an 
aggressor?‛134 
 
 
Turchenko, Panchenko and Timchenko argue that the Second World for 
 
Ukraine began on September 17, 1939 (the day Red Army entered Polish territory): 
 
 
 
 
‚The   beginning  of the  Second  World  War  was  preceded  by the 
conclusion  of the  Soviet-German  non-aggression  pact  on the  23rd 
 
 
133  Yu. V. Burakov, G. M. Kiparenko and S. P. Movchan, Vsevitnia istoriia. Novitni chasi: 
Pidruchnik dlia 11 kl. zagal’nosvit. navch. zakl., Kiev, Geneza, 2006, pp. 4-5. 
134  Ibid. 
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of August, 1939. The secret agreement between the Germany and the 
 
USSR made a graphic display of the imperial essence of both powers 
and the cynical dropping of the generally used international relations 
principles by its leadership. The Soviet-German pact allowed Adolf 
Hitler’s  to start  the  aggression  in Europe.  On the 1st  of September, 
1939 the Nazi troops invaded Poland. England and France, having the 
inter-allied agreements with Poland, declared the war on Germany. 
These actions gave a start to the Second World War.‛135 
 
 
‚September  17< in agreement with the German authorities, the Red 
Army crossed the Polish-Soviet border and entered Polish territory. 
This meant the beginning of war for the Soviet Union.‛136 
 
 
‚In September of 1939 the Ukraine entered the Second World War. 
Having   sustained   severe   losses, the   Ukrainian   nation   made 
an honourable  contribution  into  the  victory  of the  United  Nations 
over the aggressor.‛137 
 
 
 
The pre-war period is given in a very abridged and peculiar way. There is 
no  mention  of  the  "Munich  plot"  or  "Anschluss",  or  the  intensive  "pacifying 
policy"  of the  Anglo-French  politicians  who  were  successively  yielding  Hitler 
everything and anything he needed to create the engine of war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135      Fedir   Grigorovich   Turchenko,   Petro   Panteleimonovich   Panchenko   and    
Sergii Mikhailovich  Timchenko,  Novitnia  istoriia  Ukraini  (1939-2001):  Pidruchnik  dlia   
11  kl. zagal’nosvit. navch. Zakk., Kiev, Geneza, 2006, pp. 4-5. 
136  Ibid., p. 
5. 
137  Ibid., p. 
68. 
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Also,  many  efforts  were  made  in  order  to  re-interpret  the  role  of  an 
independent  Ukrainian  state  and  of  the  Banderites  in  World  War  II.  The 
Banderites were supporters of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Organization of 
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). On June 30, 1941, surrounded by German armies, 
the OUN declared Ukraine an independent state.  The Nazis repressed the OUN 
by  arresting  its leader, and drove the organization underground. In the fall of 
1942,  OUN  re-emerged  as  the  Ukrainian  Insurgent  Army  (UIA)  and  fought 
against both, the Germans and the Red Army. For some time the UIA succeeded 
to control Galiciia region, but later failed to resist the Soviet Red Army and finally 
lost its influence. 
 
 
 
The UIA continued a guerrilla war for the Ukrainian independence until 
 
1953, when Soviet authorities finally succeeded in getting rid of the organization. 
Soviet propaganda demonized Stepan Bandera and his followers and omitted his 
name   completely   from   newspapers   and   textbooks.   UIA’s   activities   were 
condemned  and laden with descriptions of evil and danger.138  But while during 
Soviet years, these movements and their leader, Stepan Bandera, were depicted in 
the most negative terms, the new Ukrainian historical narrative tried to provide a 
more objective interpretation of events, highlighting OUN and UIA role in trying 
to gain Ukraine’s independence: 
 
138  Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine, The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1998, p. 164. 
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‚The  NKVD  destroyed  all  political  parties  and  unions,  and  even 
 
highly respected Prosvita. Actions of the repressive regime supported 
by  the  Red  Army  weapons  convinced  population  of  the  Western 
Ukraine that the future of the Ukrainian people lays not in the Soviet 
Union but in an independent Ukrainian state.‛139 
 
 
 
The glorification of the UIA is often resented by Eastern Ukrainians, who 
perceive themselves as the ‚enemy‛  against whom the partisans fought. Many 
call for a more objective appraisal of these events and urge the Ukrainian state to 
create  a   ‘united’  view  concerning  events  during  wartime  across  the  whole 
Ukraine. 
 
 
 
Overall, the Second World War is presented as a continuous struggle of 
two  national resistance  movements.  The  independent  OUN movement  would 
fight for the national independence and the Soviet partisans would fight for the 
Soviet idea: 
 
 
 
"The   independent   OUN   movement   posed   great   threat   to the 
occupation regime. Comparing the range of the OUN and the Soviet 
resistance in the Ukraine, German command had to admit in its secret 
order   dated   the   31st   of December,   1941:   ‘There   is not   a single 
rebellious organization in the Ukraine that would be capable to threat 
 
 
139      Fedir   Grigorovich   Turchenko,   Petro   Panteleimonovich   Panchenko   and    
Sergii Mikhailovich  Timchenko,  Novitnia  istoriia  Ukraini  (1939-2001):  Pidruchnik  dlia   
11  kl. zagal’nosvit. navch. Zakk., Kiev, Geneza, 2006, p. 8. 
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the  German regime,  except the OUN-B group’. Despite the  heavy 
 
losses, OUN members continued to fight until the last days of the 
occupation".140 
 
 
‚Soviet  authorities supported both resistance movements. In these 
conditions, OUN/UIA had to fight on two fronts without any help 
from outside.‛141 
 
 
 
This new revised version of the Ukrainian history of the Second World War 
was  often  perceived  by  the  teachers,  students  and  their  parents  as  a  ‚direct 
outcome of  western Ukrainians gaining political power in Kiev and using it to 
foster their own historical views onto the rest of Ukraine.‛142 
 
 
 
In 2011, the term ‚Great Patriotic War‛  for the Soviet War against Nazi 
Germany  returned  in  several  textbooks.  According  to  an  article  in  Ukrainian 
Russian-language journal Segodnya, in the new history textbook which will be 
taught in class from September 2011, the term ‚Great Patriotic War‛ for the Soviet 
War against Nazi Germany  is used (instead of the use of World War II). The term 
‘Orange  Revolution’ has disappeared, and  the section on the  Organization of 
 
 
 
 
140       Fedir   Grigorovich   Turchenko,   Petro   Panteleimonovich   Panchenko   and   Sergii 
Mikhailovich  Timchenko,  Novitnia  istoriia  Ukraini  (1939-2001):  Pidruchnik  dlia  11  kl. 
zagal’nosvit. navch. Zakk., Kiev, Geneza, 2006, pp. 69-70. 
141   Ibid. 
142   Peter W. Rodgers,  ‚Compliance  or Contradiction? Teaching ‘History’ in the  ‘New’ 
Ukraine. A View from Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands.‛  Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 59, no. 3 
(May 2007), p. 514. 
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Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Resistance Army (UIA) has been reduced. 
The tender was originally won by three books – those of Olena Pometun, Oleksy 
Stukevych  and Stanislav Kul’chytsky. The latter book by a historian known for 
his studies, among other things, on Holodomor (which he considers genocide) was 
removed, leaving history to be taught using two textbooks.143 
 
 
 
 
According  to  the  newspaper  Segodnya,  the  textbooks  have  changed  a 
lot:  the term ‚Great Patriotic War‛ is given pride of place as title to the relevant 
section  (the   section  was  previously  called  ‚Ukraine  in  the  Second  World 
War‛).  While the information about OUN-UPA is reduced, Segodnya does not see 
any pronounced anti-nationalist line – the struggle by the UPA and that by Soviet 
partisans  is  presented   in  roughly  equal  amounts. The  participants  in  the 
nationalist movement are called fighters against Stalinist totalitarianism, but at 
the same time are mentioned among the list of collaborators.144 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143   Tatiana Negoda, ‚V  uchebniki vernuli  Velikuiu Otechestvennuiu, a OUN urezali,‛ 
Segodnia, 27.08.11. Consulted online athttp://www.segodnya.ua/print/news/14282486.html 
on 29.08.2011. 
144   Ibid. 
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Ukrainian SSR after 1945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Khrushchev’s Thaw period which followed Stalin’s death is usually 
well  perceived by the Ukrainian historians. They recognize it as a promising 
change to the suffocating regime of the Stalinist era. It stands out for its sudden 
openness, rehabilitation of Stalin’s victims, flowering of the national cultures and 
rising standards of living. However, the period is also remembered for the return 
of Russification, failed agricultural experiments and rushed diplomacy.145 
 
 
 
On one hand, in the textbooks, there is genuine appreciation for reforms. 
For instance, Turchenko et al. (1995, 2004) notes that the economic 
decentralization led to modernization of industry, development of different types 
of industries and that standards of living rose sharply in the second half of the 
1950s. Similarly,  the  relative  freedom  of expression  allowed  a resurrection  of 
Ukrainian culture, but for a short period. On the other hand, it is argued that 
these reforms were merely a compromise in order to attain other objectives: 
 
 
 
‚The  party  leadership  realized  that  without  a  certain  measure  of 
 
democratization it would not be possible to modernize the country, 
 
 
 
145   Jan Germent Janmaat, ‚The Ethnic ‘Other’ in Ukrainian History Textbooks: the Case of 
Russia and the Russians,‛ Compare, vol. 37, no. 3 (June 2007), p. 318. 
85 
 
 
 
 
accelerate  its  economic  development  and  maintain  its  status  as  a 
 
military superpower.‛146 
 
 
 
 
Turchenko et al. constantly remind the reader that freedom of expression 
was  very limited. Moreover, they claim that a renewed Russification campaign, 
launched by  Khrushchev only further weakened the position of  the Ukrainian 
language in education and many other domains. Moreover, the authors continue 
to define the Soviet State as the totalitarian power, despite Stalin’s death in 1953: 
 
 
 
‚The  totalitarian regime was not interested in developing national 
cultures, because it was much easier to control one ‚mass‛, or ‚Soviet 
people‛ than to deal with each nation separately. Nevertheless, the 
Communist  Party  continued  on  its  policy  of  ‚internationalism‛, 
which in reality meant russification of the Ukrainians and other 
nationalities  of  Ukraine.  As  a  result,  the  cause  for  the  national 
resurrection for the Ukraine’s minorities was taken  on not by the 
Communist   Party   or   by   the   Ukraine   politicians,   but   by   the 
opposition.‛147 
 
 
 
In the same  manner the  books address the  Chernobyl nuclear disaster. 
‚Who is to blame?‛ – ask the texts. The Soviet textbooks would usually detail the 
catastrophic  ecological  situation  and  then  blame  the  Ukrainian  scholars  and 
specialists who failed to ensure the safety of atomic energy: 
 
 
146   Turchenko et al, 1995, p.56 and 2004, p. 124. 
147   Turchenko et al., 2006, pp. 223-224. 
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‚Criminal was the position adopted by the former Minister of Health 
 
Protection of the Ukrainian SSR, A. Iu. Romanenko, and many other 
responsible  figures  who  for  a  prolonged  period  remained  silent 
regarding the real danger to people’s health due to the accident in 
Chernobyl. It is true that there were independent medical teams in 
Ukraine   who   immediately   saw   the   threat   of   the   Chernobyl 
catastrophe to the health of people and did everything to provide 
emergency medical help. These were the specialists of the military- 
medical service of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR. The top medical 
leadership in Moscow and Kiev did not abide by the results of their 
scientific  research  and  medical  training.  For  years  the  leadership 
ignored the successful work of their colleagues and the laws of nature 
as well.‛148 
 
 
The indictment of individuals in this passage represents a radical break 
from traditional practices of Soviet historiography, where important Party officials 
would be irreproachable and ‚enemies of the people‛ would be found and blamed 
for  the  incident.  But  the  post-Soviet  Ukrainian  textbooks  rarely  gave  detailed 
description of the events. Already, in 1992 textbook, there is only one reference to 
the Chernobyl disaster, in a section entitled ‚Ukraine on the Path to Freedom and 
Independence‛: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
148   M. V. Koval and al., Istoriia Ukraini, Kyiv, Osvita, 1991, p. 343. Translated by Catherine 
Wanner. 
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‚The  administrative-command system repressed any kind of 
 
progressive beginnings. Even when the economic crisis of the country 
was obvious, the plenary session of the Twenty-Seventh Congress of 
the  Communist Party of Ukraine, the First Secretary of the Central 
Committee, V. V. Shcherbitskii continued to assert that the economy of 
Ukraine had made the great progress< But one had to respond and 
support Moscow even when nature sneered during a flowering April, 
and  even during events surrounding the Chernobyl Atomic Nuclear 
Station near Kiev.‛149 
 
 
 
 
 
Chernobyl is still given startlingly little attention in the Ukrainian school 
textbooks. This could be explained by the energy politics of Ukraine, which have 
become, especially in the last ten years a sore point of contention, for Ukraine has 
to purchase energy from other countries. Ukraine has amassed a massive debt to 
Russia for energy supplies and has to rely on its own sources, which include four 
nuclear power plants (one of which is the largest in Europe). 
 
 
 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both, the West and Russia lost 
interest in Ukraine for a while. Russia was preoccupied with its own problems of 
domestic  socio-economic and political stabilization and consolidation and could 
not  at  the  time  conduct  an  active  foreign  policy  towards  Ukraine  as  well  as 
 
 
 
149   M. V.  Koval,  Istoriia Ukraini, Kyiv,  Raiduha, 1992, p. 465. Translated  by Catherine 
Wanner. 
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towards other former Soviet Union countries. Moreover, there was no necessity of 
conducting a more active policy: the majority of Russians did not take Ukraine’s 
separation seriously, assuming that it would sooner or later reintegrate in Russia. 
But according to some history textbooks in Ukraine, by the end of the 1980s, 
 
 
 
‚The  Ukrainian population was convinced that the Soviet Union was 
not  worth saving. This conviction was fundamental for the national 
liberation  movement  growing  at  that  time.  It  was  made  possible 
thanks to the rise of national idea in Ukrainian society of the time, the 
birth of Ukrainian dissident movement and rise of awareness on the 
part of Ukrainian nomenklatura (which became exhausted to deal with 
Soviet Government).‛150 
 
 
‚The  attempt to save the USSR by the conservative powers was not 
supported   by   the   Ukrainian   population.   After   the   putsch   was 
suppressed, the Ukrainian republic became even more motivated to 
become independent, and a new, independent, self-sufficient country 
appeared – Ukraine!‛151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
150  Turchenko et al., 2006, p. 272. 
151  Ibid., p. 274. 
89 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the last fifteen years, Ukraine has been through the great changes, 
including the Declaration of Independence of 1991 and the Orange Revolution of 
2004. While independence was achieved enthusiastically, the Ukrainians now had 
to deal with economic and political instability on all levels of society. In order to 
unite the country and to bring stability, the Ukrainian state adopted a new and 
revised   historical   narrative,  adopting  school  history  textbooks  to  the  new 
historical narrative. 
 
 
 
This new narrative has been since widespread across Ukraine and did not 
meet  much opposition. In fact, the lack of protest on the part of Russophone 
population can be seen as evidence that more ‘nationalist’ historical narrative is 
not  rejected  by  Ukrainian  population.  However,  the  numerous  conflicts  have 
occurred  in  recent  years  in  several  ex-Soviet  republics.  These  developments 
highlight the importance of ethnic tolerance in post-communist societies. 
 
 
 
After   becoming   an   independent   State   in   1991,   Ukraine   conducted 
profound economic, political, cultural and educational reforms. The aim was to 
create  a  society  with  distinctly  developed  national  identity  and  culture.  Still, 
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Ukrainians remain as separated as ever. Even today, Ukrainian identity is often a 
sense of who you are and where you are from – is commonly understood through 
a  highly developed level of nationalistic consciousness. 
 
 
 
The Ukrainian history textbooks have changed many times over the years. 
The  most conspicuous feature of the texts, however, remained the same. The 
textbooks  would unanimously condemn the foreign ruler – Russia in the years 
prior to the October Revolution and the Soviet Union later on. To the Russian and 
Soviet  authorities   were  attributed  malicious  intentions,  irrespective  of  their 
actions and their  consequences for the Ukrainian nation. The Russian or Soviet 
rulers always seemed to care to improve Russia’s well-being at the expense of the 
Ukrainian population. 
 
 
 
The books clearly show that the only motivation these rulers had was to 
tighten Russia’s grip on power and to subjugate Ukraine to Russian interests. The 
books also stress that neither Russia, nor Soviet Union were democratic regimes 
and therefore their actions, motivated by power considerations, were 
inconsiderate of people and often resorted to use of force. These exceptionally 
critical  accounts  of  foreign  rulers  aim  to  foster  patriotism  amongst  younger 
population of  Ukrainians.  These  texts somehow  suggest that freedom for  the 
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Ukrainian  people  can  only be  guaranteed by  an existence  of an  independent 
 
Ukrainian state. 
 
 
 
 
An  important  aspect  of  history  education  in  Ukraine  is  the 
treatment of ‘ethnic others’. For Ukraine it was easy to find an acceptable ‘ethnic 
other’:  Russia  and  the  Russians  became  an  obvious  choice.  And  while  the 
majority   of   the   authors   refrained   from   putting   ethnic   labels   on   historic 
individuals  or  organizations,  many  authors  would  struggle  to  portray  non- 
Ukrainians (Russians or Jews) in positive light. 
 
 
 
All  these  years  the  geo-historical  division  of  Ukraine  influenced  the 
politics  of education in Ukraine. Contemporary Ukraine is made up of several 
large regions,  each having a history and sometimes even language of its own. 
Often, teachers in the different regions of Ukraine have to adapt certain historical 
interpretations to their own  views on history. They tend to subtly change the 
accent or focus away from a ‘nationalist’ or ‘negative’ stance toward Russia to a 
more  tolerant  view  and  in  doing   so  they  reinforce  a  particular  regional 
understanding of past events.152  Therefore, we can see that the task of creating a 
unifying rather than a divisive national history so far is proving to be extremely 
 
 
 
152   Peter W. Rodgers, ‚Compliance  or Contradiction? Teaching ‘History’ in the  ‘New’ 
Ukraine. A View from Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands.‛  Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 59, no. 3 
(May 2007), p. 517. 
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difficult for the Ukrainian officials and historians. In today’s Ukrainian society a 
deep desire to learn about their country’s past is shared among many people. But 
as long as there is no unifying version of the events every individual has to learn 
about history of Ukraine on his own terms. 
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Chapter III 
 
 
 
 
Post-Soviet Narrative in Estonia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It remains an empirical question when and to 
what extent modern populations understand 
themselves as a nation based on ethnic membership, 
or as a nation of citizens.” 
 
Jürgen Habermas, philosopher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Separate Schooling – Different History? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  school  is  always  a  starting  point  of  production  of  the  officially 
 
authorized  version  of  a  country’s  history.  However,  the  ways  in  which  this 
 
‘official history’ is taught in the classroom are not necessarily the same in all 
schools  in a given country. The Estonian school system is characterized by a 
separate  schooling  of  students  from  different  ethnic,  linguistic  and  religious 
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backgrounds.  The  result  is  a  different  curriculum  for  students  from different 
communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the collapse of the USSR, Estonia inherited the Soviet system of 
separate schooling for students from major ethnic and linguistic groups in the 
country. But one of the first goals of the newly-independent Estonian government 
was to create a  school system that would facilitate the integration of Estonian 
minorities. The  Estonian  government  wanted to  use education as  a tool  to 
transform Estonia’s minorities into  groups that would understand and identify 
with Estonian history, culture, and language.153 
 
 
 
 
 
First, in the early 1990s, in order to promote a civic Estonian identity, the 
Estonian government passed the legislation to protect and disseminate Estonian 
language.  Estonian  became  the  only  official  language  in  the  country  and  the 
primary  language  used  in  government  organizations,  higher  education,  and 
public spheres. However, even today in Estonia Russian-speaking parents mostly 
send their children to so-called Russian schools.154  Still, the educational system in 
 
 
 
 
153   Kara Brown, ‚The  Education of Russian-Speakers in Estonia‛  in Educational reform in 
post-Soviet Russia: legacies and prospects  by Ben Eklof, Eugene Larry Holmes  and Vera 
Kaplan, New York, Frank Cass, 2005, p. 176. 
154   The schools where Russian is the main language of instruction. 
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Estonia today is not completely divided. According to Estonian data, before 2007 
about 5  000 students whose mother-tongue was not Estonian were studying in 
schools where  Estonian was the main language of instruction, and about fifty 
Russian pre-schools  and  basic schools joined the Estonian language immersion 
program.155 
 
 
 
 
 
In post-Soviet Estonia, Russian-speaking parents have two choices: one 
option  is  to  enrol  their  children  in  Estonian  school.  This  ensures  fluency  in 
Estonian, but  can lead to assimilation – an outcome many Russian-speakers do 
not want. The second choice, taken by the majority of Russian-speaking parents, 
is enrolment in Russian schools. This option guarantees a child’s ability to speak 
Russian  properly  and  introduces  the  student  to  Russian  cultural  traditions. 
However, enrolment in most Russian schools essentially relegates the child to an 
inferior  position  in  Estonian  society;  the  majority  of  Russian  schools  do  not 
adequately develop students’ Estonian skills and without them a young person’s 
future educational and employment opportunities are limited.156 
 
 
 
 
 
155   T.  Matlik  cited  in  Golubeva,  Marina,  ‚Different   History,  Different  Citizenship? 
Completing  Narratives  and  Diverging  Civil  Enculturation  in  Majority  and  Minority 
Schools in Estonia and Latvia,‛ Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. 41, no. 3 (September 2010), p. 
317. 
156   Kara Brown, ‚The  Education of Russian-Speakers in Estonia‛  in Educational reform in 
post-Soviet Russia: legacies and prospects by Eklof, Ben, Larry Holmes, Eugene, and Vera 
Kaplan, New York, Frank Cass, 2005, p. 178. 
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Nonetheless, the tendency remains for Russian-speaking parents to send 
their  children  to  ‘Russian  schools’.  The  culture  of  education  in  these  schools 
remains   essentially  Russian.  Moreover,  these  schools  use  the  same  history 
textbooks that  are  used in Russia. Each year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Russia sends textbooks  to all Russian schools abroad (including Canada157) in 
order to support education in  Russian-speaking communities over the world. 
Russian schools are encouraged to use Estonian history textbooks in their classes; 
however, they often fail to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
Estonian Education System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Estonia the provision of general education at all levels of education is 
carried  out  on  the  base  of  common  national  curriculum,  irrespective  of  the 
language of instruction. Schools prepare their own curricula on the basis of this 
 
 
 
 
 
157   In fall 2009, I worked as a substitute history teacher in Russian-language school  
in 
Montreal. At the beginning of the year, the school would receive from Russia the new 
textbooks on many subjects ranging from biology and geography to history and literature. 
The  books  needed  to  be  obtained  from  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Russia  in 
Moscow or from the Ministry of Education of Russia in Moscow. The Ministries would 
not send the books directly to the schools in Montreal, but they would gather them and 
make them available for a pick-up in Moscow. The school then had to find someone who 
could bring the books to Montreal; otherwise shipping fees would make it impossible to 
acquire them. 
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national curriculum. Basic education can be acquired partially in primary schools 
 
(grades 1–6), in basic schools (grades 1 – 9) or in upper secondary schools (grades 
 
10 – 11).158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compulsory basic school subjects include Estonian or Russian Language 
and  Literature,  two  foreign  languages  (English,  Russian,  German  or  French), 
Mathematics, Natural Science, Geography, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, History, 
Human Studies, Social Studies, Music, Art, Physical Education, Manual Training. 
Studying Estonian as a second language is obligatory in schools using Russian or 
another foreign language as  the language of instruction. Estonian can also be 
studied  as  a  second language  in  Estonian  language  schools  by  pupils  whose 
mother tongue is other than Estonian. 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to successfully graduate from basic school, students are required 
to  complete the curriculum and successfully pass three basic school graduation 
examinations, which include an examination in Estonian language and literature 
or Estonian as a second language.159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
158   For more details see Figure 3. 
159   Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, http://www.hm.ee/index.php?1510024. 
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Recently, Estonian government took steps to make important changes in 
its  education system. It was decided that, as of the 2011-2012 academic year, 
Estonian will be the only language of instruction in all upper secondary schools in 
Estonia. The schools can choose the ‚Estonian curriculum or Estonian as a second 
language curriculum  as the basis for teaching Estonian, and organize the state 
examination  necessary  for  graduation  according  to  the  curriculum  they  have 
chosen (either  a composition in  Estonian or an examination in  Estonian  as  a 
second  language).‚   The  upper   secondary  school  curriculum  will  contain  a 
minimum of 57 courses where Estonian  for the first time since almost hundred 
years will be used as the main language of instruction.160 
 
 
 
 
Estonian Pre-Soviet and Soviet History 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estonia’s drive for independent statehood is understandable: the country 
remained under foreign rule for centuries. First, the Estonians fell under Danish, 
German,  and Swedish influence. Then the country was annexed by Peter the 
Great in the early eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, the country was 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160  Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, http://www.hm.ee/index.php?1510031. 
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dominated by Baltic German nobility and remained outside the Russian cultural 
sphere.161 
 
 
 
 
 
After  the  October  Revolution,  the  Bolsheviks  gave  up  Russia’s  Baltic 
possessions in March 1918, when they signed a separate peace with Germany at 
Brest-Litovsk. Following the signature, revolutionary Russia was then forced to 
recognize the independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia once the World War 
I    ended.    In the beginning, Estonia   was   successful   in maintaining   its 
independence. And, for a while, it was a part of the French-organized ‚cordon 
sanitaire”, metaphorical barrier intended to isolate Soviet ideology from spreading 
in the West. But the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 ended Estonia’s 
independent  existence. Estonia was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence. 
Soviet troops were placed and remained on Estonian territory until the break-up 
of the Soviet Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
After 1939, Estonia went through the period of mass deportation of its 
citizens  during Stalin’s repressions; German conquest at the beginning of the 
German attack  of  the USSR; initial collaboration with the Germans; and finally, 
re-conquest  by  the  Red  Army.  These  events  were  accompanied  by  more 
 
 
161   Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Lost Empire, Armonk, London, M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 30. 
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deportations, several partisan movements (against both, the Germans and the 
Soviets), forced collectivization, and the arrival of numerous Soviet settlers in the 
area. Originally, the settlers would be sent by Moscow, in hopes of consolidating 
Moscow’s hold on the  republics, but later they would remain in Estonia (even 
after 1991) attracted by the higher living standards and more Western way of live. 
162  Indeed, throughout the years, Estonia managed to maintain a higher standard 
 
of living than anywhere else in the Soviet Union and somehow keep its national 
spirit. 
 
 
 
 
 
Estonia gained its ‘real’ independence for the first time after the collapse 
of the  August 1991 Moscow putsch. However, the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
proceeded very slowly and Estonians had to co-exist with the ‘Soviet presence’ on 
its territory. At the same time, the country had to overcome economic problems, 
declines in production, a difficult housing situation and out-dated infrastructures. 
Also,  there  was  the   psychological  legacy  of  Soviet  life:  bureaucracy,  low 
productivity, corruption, and high levels of graft and theft.163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162   Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Lost Empire, Armonk, London, M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 31. 
163   Ibid. 
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Following the Collapse 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the Western media, in 1980 in Tallinn almost 2 000 Estonian 
school  students rallied against Soviet rule and demanded freedom for Estonia. 
They were opposed by the Russian students living in Estonia.164  The antagonism 
continued until 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev’s new policy of openness, glasnost, 
was launched. The  policy suggested to ‚fill  the blank spots in history‛ and to 
begin history discussions  across the Soviet Union. The issues of historical truth 
deeply  touched  Estonian  people.  Once  a  seemingly  united  socialist  country, 
Estonia was breaking up into separate  nations. History started being used to 
reinforce the new national identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
The  new,  revised  history  was  presented  bit  by  bit.  Often,  the  exile 
historiography  contributed  to  the  change.  It  was  very  political  and  meant  to 
destroy  the Soviet identity in Estonia. ‚Estonians  wanted to be Estonians, with 
roots in  Estonian  history.‛165   The issue of the share of national history rose to 
prominence at the Riga conference on history in the Soviet Union. Unlike some 
 
 
 
 
 
164   Sirkka  Ahonen,  Clio  Sans  Uniform:  A  Study of  the Post-Marxist  transformation  of  the 
History   Curricula   in   East   Germany   and   Estonia,   1986-1991,   Helsinki,   Suomalainen 
Tiedeakatemia, 1992, p.101. 
165   Ibid. 
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countries, which already had national history as part of their curriculum, Estonia 
had only bits of its history integrated into teaching of the USSR history.166 
 
 
 
 
 
Moscow insisted on considering Soviet history as the native history. But 
the  Estonians wanted to make their own decisions on education. After many 
debates, it was decided to revise the school curriculum. The curriculum of 1986 
was still very Soviet in its content and tone. But work continued and the 1988 old 
Moscow-outlined curriculum was reprinted with some changes: first, there was a 
reference  to  glasnost;  the  chapters  on  the  Estonian  nineteenth  century  were 
expanded; but overall the curriculum remained as Soviet as it used to be.167 
 
 
 
 
 
The  1987  teaching  conference  had  renounced  the  old  curriculum  and 
textbooks. It was also decided that the ‚false‛  history education should not be 
reinforced by pupils taking exams on it; and history examinations were forbidden 
in 1988. The main goal was to establish a national history. The approach had to be 
Estonian and not to borrow and foreign curricular ideas. 168 
 
 
 
 
166   Ibid. In Estonia there was a maximum of 55 lessons of Estonian history out of a 
whole 
612 history lessons in the eleven years of school. 
167   Sirkka  Ahonen,  Clio  Sans  Uniform:  A  Study of  the Post-Marxist  transformation  of  the 
History Curricula in East Germany and Estonia, 1986-1991, Helsinki, Suomalainen 
Tiedeakatemia, 1992, p.105. 
168  Ibid. 
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The Revolutions Reconsidered 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us begin our study of Estonian textbooks by comparing two Estonians 
syllabi, one from 1988 and the second from 1990: 
 
1988 1990 
‚Our   country‛   from   the   bourgeois 
 
revolutions  of  1905  and  1917  to  the 
Great  October Revolution; the 
Revolution,   the   civil   war   and   the 
foreign   intervention   in   Estonia;   the 
building   of   the   socialist   society   in 
Russia up to 1937; the  bourgeois 
dictatorship    in    Estonia 1920-1940. 
Capitalist  countries  in  the  inter-war 
period. 
Estonian history from prehistory to the 
 
present, including the periods: 
Prehistory  –  the  Middle  Ages  –  The 
Swedish rule – the national movement 
in Estonia – the Estonian independence 
– Estonia under the Soviet Union. 
Soviet Union from the Great Patriotic 
 
War of  1941-1945  to  the  present.  The 
 
Estonian  people  in  the  Patriotic  War: 
Contemporary history from1937 to the 
 
present: World War II. The world, 1945- 
 
1975, developments in the big 
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the   collaboration   of   the   bourgeoisie 
 
with  Germany.  The  liberation  of  the 
Estonian  people.  The  accomplishment 
of the socialist society in the USSR. 
countries.  The  world  after  1975:  the 
 
Western world, the socialist countries, 
the Third World.169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Soviet syllabi stressed the Marxist idea of the crucial importance of 
 
revolutions  as  the  engines  of  history  and  agents  of  positive  change.  But  the 
reformed 1990 syllabi did not treat the two revolutions (of 1905-1907 and 1917) as 
a consequence of the French Revolution. The Stalinist interpretation of the events 
implied  the  association  of  the  Estonian  independence  of  1918-1940  with  the 
participation in  the socialist world revolution. This interpretation of the events 
was  completely   reviewed. According  to  1991  textbook  by  Adamson  and 
Valmaad, 
 
 
 
 
‚In 1905, Estonian people learnt their first serious political lesson 
in   order  to  continue  their  struggle  for  freedom.  Estonians 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169   Sirkka  Ahonen,  Clio  Sans  Uniform:  A  Study of  the Post-Marxist  transformation  of  the 
History   Curricula   in   East   Germany   and   Estonia,   1986-1991,   Helsinki,   Suomalainen 
Tiedeakatemia, 1992, p.111. 
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gathered their forces< without 1905 the Estonians would not be 
 
able to fight for independence in 1917-1920.‛170 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estonian historians further  destroyed  ‚the  October legend‛  by regarding 
Russian  Revolution as a coup rather than a true revolution.171  They argued that 
there the  October Revolution was ‚bloodless‛  and that Estonia attempted, but 
missed its chance to gain independence from the Soviets: 
 
 
 
 
 
‚Estonian    nationalists   attempted   to   conduct   the   necessary 
reforms. But since the political and national idea had not formed 
yet  in  order  to  gain  complete  independence,  they  decided  to 
continue their struggle for autonomy within Russian State.‛172 
 
 
 
‚< Red Terror is a myth. The opposition had a chance to do 
anything.   During   the   November   election   three-quarters   of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170   Andres Adamson and Sulev Valmaad, Eesti Ajalugu, gumnaasiumile, Kirjastus, 
Koolibri, 
1991. 
171   Sirkka  Ahonen,  Clio  Sans  Uniform:  A  Study of  the Post-Marxist  transformation  of  the 
History Curricula in East Germany and Estonia, 1986-1991, Helsinki, Suomalainen 
Tiedeakatemia, 1992, p.108. 
172   Mati Laur, Ago Pajur and Tonu Tanneberg, Eesti Ajalugu II, Tallinn, Avita, 1997, p. 
38. 
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Estonians supported the Socialists< It will take seventy years for 
 
the next ‘free’ elections in Russia to take place.‛173 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the new syllabi Russia started being portrayed as a foreign country and 
the events of 1917 were presented as a sequence of sporadic changes. The Civil 
War description had changed as well. In fact, the term ‘Civil War’ was not used 
by many  authors. The period is referred to as a ‚struggle  for liberation‛.  The 
authors mention ‚Soviet intervention‛ several times: 
 
 
 
 
 
‚The  Soviet  authorities  tried  to  mask  Soviet  intervention  and 
present it as the Civil War by using Estonian Bolsheviks, which 
escaped the Germans by running to Russia, as their means.‛174 
 
 
 
 
‚Even  today Russia ignores Treaty of Tartu175 . The Estonian’s 
right for its own independence has more important basis for it 
than Tartu peace, it is people’s right for self-determination that 
should decide destiny of Estonian people.‛176 
 
 
 
 
173   Andres Adamson and Sulev Valmaad, Eesti Ajalugu, gumnaasiumile, Kirjastus, Koolibri, 
1991, pp. 159-160. 
174   Mati Laur, Ago Pajur and Tonu Tanneberg, Eesti Ajalugu II, Tallinn, Avita, 1997, p. 46. 
175    Treaty  of  Tartu  –  the  treaty  with  Bolshevik  Russia,  which  recognized  Estonia’s 
independence. 
176   Andres Adamson and Sulev Valmaad, Eesti Ajalugu, gumnaasiumile, Kirjastus, Koolibri, 
1991, p. 174. 
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Estonian Annexation or Occupation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR divided the 
Baltic States between the two powers.  In the Estonian SSR syllabus of 1988, the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was presented with the excuse of it being a consequence 
of the Western policies of appeasement. In the new syllabi of 1990 the excuses were 
left out and the secret protocol, which predetermined Estonian history for several 
decades, was  included. Additional accounts on 1940 in Estonia were presented. 
What previously was called ‚revolution‛ was called ‚occupation‛: 
 
 
 
 
 
1986 1990 
The extension of the fraternal family of 
 
the Soviet peoples< The resumption of 
 
the  power  of  the  Soviets  in  Estonia 
 
1940. The deepening of the 
revolutionary crisis. The ultimatum of 
the Soviet government in June 16th. The 
revolutionary  demonstrations   of 
The end of Estonian independence. The 
 
beginning of World War II and its 
significance to Estonians. The Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocol. 
The mutual assistance pact of 
September 28,  1939. The  complete 
occupation of the  country on June 17, 
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workers. The suppression of the fascist 
 
government. The making of the 
people’s  government.  The  declaration 
of   Soviet  power  in  Estonia  and  the 
reception of  Estonia  into  the  unity of 
the Soviet Union. 
1940. The annexation of Estonia to the 
 
Soviet Union. 
Socialist  construction  in  the  Estonian 
 
Soviet   Socialist   Republic,   1940-1941. 
The  creation  of  a  Soviet  state  on  the 
basis of the constitution of the Estonian 
SSR. The nationalization of lands, 
industries and banks. The opposition of 
the  bourgeoisie. Reshaping of cultural 
life and education. 
The destruction of all structures of the 
 
Estonian   state.   The   collapse   of   the 
economy. The destruction of the 
cultural   institutions   of   the   Estonian 
republic.  The  decline  of  culture.  The 
Red Terror in Estonia. The 14th  of June 
1941 [first mass deportation of 
 
Estonians].177 
 
 
 
 
The  1990  interpretation  divided  history  of  Estonia  in  three  ‘blocks’  – 
Russian, German and Soviet occupation. The emphasis was put on the forceful 
annexation of Estonia: 
 
 
 
 
 
177   Cited in Sirkka Ahonen Clio Sans Uniform: A Study of the Post-Marxist transformation of 
the  History  Curricula  in  East  Germany  and  Estonia,  1986-1991,  Helsinki,  Suomalainen 
Tiedeakatemia, 1992, p.121. 
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‚On  June 17, 1940 80 000 soldiers of the Red Army entered the 
 
territory of Estonia. The Soviet occupation began and lasted for 
almost half a century. According to the international laws of the 
time,  the  actions  of  the  Soviet  authorities  in  Estonia  were 
illegal.‛178 
 
 
 
 
Estonia under Soviet Rule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The biggest credibility gap in history education in the USSR was caused by 
the blank spots, historical events or acts which have been deliberately omitted to 
suit the  current version of ‘official’ history. In order to build a ‚second‛, ‚real‛ 
history of Estonia, the authors often referred to the common memories. They also 
tried to describe  periods which were earlier not included in the textbooks more 
vividly and opposing Estonians and the ‘others’: 
 
 
 
 
‚Many  factories, power stations and facilities, which Estonia did 
not really need, were built in Estonia. The goods, manufactured 
there, were shipped to the East. The waste and the workers, who 
 
 
 
178   Andres Adamson and Sulev Valmaad, Eesti Ajalugu, gumnaasiumile, Kirjastus, Koolibri, 
1991, p. 207. 
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could  not  even  speak  Estonian,  with  their  strange  mentality, 
 
character and traditions, - remained in Estonia< Estonia became 
an  annexed country with many military bases on its territory. 
The retired officers would remain in Estonia for good. One of the 
goals of the Kremlin was to mix people, to make the Estonians a 
minority in  their own country and to russify them. The Soviet 
authorities wanted to destroy political, cultural, and intellectual 
elites of Estonia in order to create new, Russian-speaking cadres. 
It  was  partly  accomplished:  many  ‚strangers‛  who  moved  
to Estonia forgot their own language, people and history, they 
are homeless travelers. People like this, who forgot their home 
and their fathers, are usually despised.‛179 
 
 
 
 
The post-Soviet discourse implied complete rejection of Stalinism. With 
glasnost   the  information  of  the  Stalinist  purges  became  open.  In  Western 
historiography the massive purges had been talked about since World War II. In 
the Soviet Union the  rehabilitation of the Stalin’s victims started at the XXth 
Communist Party Congress,  but more revelations came later, after Brezhnev’s 
death. It was finally acceptable to speak about Stalin’s victims in the media and 
to start composing a new version of that period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179   Andres Adamson and Sulev Valmaad, Eesti Ajalugu, gumnaasiumile, Kirjastus, Koolibri, 
1991, pp. 224-225. 
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In Estonia the first victims of the regime were Estonian communists who 
had moved to the Soviet Union in the 1930’s and were liquidated as suspected 
spies and  traitors by the end of the decade. Later, more Estonians died in the 
deportations of the 1940’s. Deportations of Estonians by the Soviet regime play 
an important role in Estonian family histories, the number of people amounting 
to as many as 140 000.180  The  first wave of deportations took place in 1941, the 
second followed the restoration of the Soviet rule in 1944 and the last happened 
in 1949.   The 1988 textbooks already recognized the purges concerning Estonian 
communists happening in the USSR in the 1930’s. The later books of the 1990’s 
ascribed the massive killings to Stalin: 
 
 
 
 
 
‚Twenty to twenty-five percent of the pre-war population 
of the Baltic countries became victims of the 
repressions.‛181 
 
 
 
 
The Second World War is blamed on Stalin as well. Like their Ukrainian 
colleagues,  Estonian  historians  do  not  use  the  term  ‘Great  Patriotic  War’  to 
describe the period of 1941-1945. The term ‘World War II’ is usually used and the 
period is generally painted very negatively. Usually, the date of signing of the 
 
180   Sirkka  Ahonen,  Clio  Sans  Uniform:  A  Study of  the Post-Marxist  transformation  of  the 
History   Curricula   in   East   Germany   and   Estonia,   1986-1991,   Helsinki,   Suomalainen 
Tiedeakatemia, 1992, p.124. 
181   Lauri, Vahtre, Eesti Ajalugu, gumnaasiumile, Kirjastus, Ilo, 2004, p. 33. 
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Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact considered being the date of the beginning of the Second 
 
World War: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‚World  War II became an incredible hardship for Estonia, 
which can be only compared to the loss of independence. 
Neither the Estonian soldiers bravery nor the suffering of 
people  could  make  up  for  the  mistakes  the  Estonian 
authorities made in the beginning of the war.‛182 
 
 
 
 
‚We  have to admit, that Estonia was one of the countries, 
which lost in the Second World War. The result of the war 
was Estonia’s loss of independence. All the decisions, 
concerning Estonia were from then on made in 
Moscow.‛183 
 
 
 
 
Also it is important to mention that during the 1940s there were several 
resistance movements in Estonia. They were mainly presented by the small scale 
nationalist partisan movements. The partisans lived in the forests and used to fight 
against  the  communist  and  even  Nazi  regimes  in  Estonia.  They  would  often 
provide aid to  those who tried to flee from the country and hide abroad. The 
stories  of  the  Estonian  partisans  were  not  omitted  from  the  1980’s  textbooks. 
 
182   Andres Adamson and Sulev Valmaad, Eesti Ajalugu, gumnaasiumile, Kirjastus, Koolibri, 
1991, p. 221. 
183   Ibid., p. 222. 
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However  the  only  partisans  the  ESSR  textbooks  mentioned  were  those  who 
resisted   the  German  occupation  of  1941-1944.  But  in  the  1990’s  they  were 
introduced in the context of the Stalin’s terror: 
 
 
 
 
 
‚In spite of defeat, the ‚Forest Brothers‛  struggle was not in 
vain. Partisan warfare had the national and unifying effect 
on Estonia. The twelve year struggle would not be possible 
without population’s support. This means that Estonians did 
not  give up, they resisted, which proves once again, that 
Estonia did not wilfully join the Soviet Union.‛184 
 
 
 
 
‚< The repressions continued. The most active fighters for 
 
independence were arrested and publicly persecuted.‛185 
 
 
 
 
 
The  period of stagnation, together with the  description of the Estonian 
partisan movement and massive deportation of Estonians, belonged to the themes 
that were only handled by Western historiography. The stagnation in the Socialist 
society was impossible; therefore it was not dealt with in the textbooks. The first 
mention of the problems in the development of the Soviet economy appears in the 
1986 syllabi. In the 1990’s textbooks the period 1956-1968 was portrayed as an 
 
 
 
184   Ibid., pp. 227-228. 
185   Mati Laur, Ago Pajur and Tonu Tanneberg, Eesti Ajalugu II, Tallinn, Avita, 1997, pp. 
130-132. 
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improvement  in  quality  of  life  in  Estonia.  Stagnation  was  recognized  as  a 
background to the necessity of change. It finally led to perestroika, perestroika led to 
an alternative Estonian development: 
 
 
 
 
 
‚Soviet authorities did not have any new ideas, success was 
rare, real enthusiasts were long gone. The system could try 
to   survive  by  establishing  repressive  measures  and  by 
cultivating  hatred towards  the West.  The  question  was,  - 
when will the system die, and will its death become a cause 
for a great war?‛ 
 
 
 
 
‚On  August 20, 1991, the  Estonian  Command decided to 
declare independence and to re-establish Estonian statehood 
de jure and de facto.‛186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186   Laur, Mati, Pajur, Ago and Tonu Tanneberg, Eesti Ajalugu II, Tallinn, Avita, 1997, p. 
145. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several years ago Tallinn was in the headlines when riots sparked across 
the small Estonian capital over the fate of a statue in honour of the Soviet soldiers 
who fought against the Nazis in World War II.  The so-called 'Monument of the 
Soldier-Liberator' -  which pays tribute to those Soviet soldiers who perished at 
the hands of the Nazis in Estonia - has become the figurehead of the complicated, 
worsening  relationship  between  Estonia  and  Russia. Tallinn's  ethnic  Estonian 
community has long regarded the  monument to be an unwelcome reminder of 
fifty  years  of  Soviet  oppression.  Estonia's  ethnic  Russian  community,  which 
comprises  a  significant third  of  the  country's  entire  population,  regarded  the 
monument as a symbol of Russia's sacrifice during World War II and a tribute to 
the Russian soldiers who died fighting Nazi Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the new history textbooks in the Baltics, for Estonia, the 
Second  World War began two years earlier in August  1939, when Stalin and 
Hitler  divided  Europe  in  half  with  the  secret  Molotov-Ribbentrop  Pact.  The 
textbooks in Estonia describe Russia's re-entry into the country in 1944 as an act of 
occupation - a regime change from one oppressive occupying force to another. 
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Indeed, during my trip to Estonia in summer 2010, the theme of the Soviet 
occupation was omnipresent in Tallinn. Right next to the  National Library of 
Estonia  one can find a modern glass building: the Museum of Occupation and of 
Fight for Freedom. The permanent exposition of the Occupations Museum opened in 
2003, and now reflects developments in Estonia from 1940 to 1991, when Estonia 
 
was ‚alternately  occupied  by  the  Soviet  Union,  Germany,  and  by  the  Soviet 
 
Union once more.‛ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of the museum’s expositions is to re-examine the issues at 
the heart of Estonia’s recent history: ‚Who are our heroes? Who are our friends? 
Who are  the  nation’s enemies? The aim is to help determine identity, to define 
and  consolidate  the  national consciousness,  and  to  teach  others  to  assess  the 
importance of statehood for a small nation.‛187 
 
 
 
 
 
And later, when collecting material for this work in the National Library of 
Estonia, I asked a librarian to help me find recent history textbooks dealing with 
Soviet  period.  „Oh,‚  –  she  said,  -„you need  the  books  on  the  history  of  the 
occupations?‚ Interestingly enough, it took less than twenty years to completely 
 
 
187   Primary research areas and priorities of the Museum of Occupation and of Fight for 
Freedom as stated on the museum’s official website: 
http://www.okupatsioon.ee/en/activities. 
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change  people’s view on their own history. What previously was called the 
 
„Great Patriotic War‚ is today referred to as „annexation‚ and „occupation‚. 
 
 
 
 
Recently, Estonian government took new steps to make important changes 
in its education system. It was decided that, as of the 2011-2012 academic year, 
Estonian will be the only language of instruction in all upper secondary schools in 
Estonia. The upper  secondary school curriculum will contain a minimum of 57 
courses where Estonian for the first time since almost hundred years will be used 
as the main language of instruction.188 
 
 
 
Estonia's Russian population - imported in large numbers during Soviet 
rule - faces many challenges today due to both their voluntary failure to integrate 
themselves in the rapidly changing society, and discriminatory national policies. 
Also,  Estonia  is  often  pressured  to  change  its  policy  requiring fluency  in  the 
national language in order to receive Estonian citizenship, which has resulted in 
half of Estonia's enormous Russian  population not having the full rights and 
benefits  of  proper  citizenship.  The  diplomatic  relations  between  Russia  and 
Estonia are complicated and Russian population in Estonia has no one to turn to 
for help in order to protect their rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188   Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, http://www.hm.ee/index.php?1510031. 
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General Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the  Soviet period, the history of the peoples of the USSR was 
rewritten several times to suit changing political demands. Both, the Red Army 
and  tsarist Russian army were glamorized, whilst the unfitting past of all the 
nations, and Russia itself, was erased. The historical role of both individuals and 
states was minimized while the history of the masses was emphasized. 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 1930s a substantial reinterpretation of history took place. Russian 
expansion was now presented as liberation from foreign domination or colonial 
conquest by other European powers. This ‚rehabilitation‛  of Russian territorial 
growth  was  carried  through  the  1940s  in  the  cause  of  mobilizing  patriotic 
sentiment against the Nazi invasion.189 
 
 
 
 
 
But  throughout  the  twentieth  century  national  histories  received  little 
attention in the school curricula. Ukrainian and Estonian children were supposed 
to learn Soviet version of history as their own. The official histories of the USSR 
 
 
 
189   Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Lost Empire, Armonk, London, M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 134. 
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used in schools focused on the history of Russia, paying little attention to the 
republics. 
 
 
 
 
 
World War II, which radically altered the situation in Europe, became the 
center of the history education first, in the USSR, and later in Russia. The Soviet 
victory in  WWII  became  a unifying event in the  Russian historical narrative. 
While in the  nineties it was no longer perceived as a source of pride, the new 
history  textbooks  of   the  2000s,  on  the  contrary,  emphasised  the  historical 
greatness of the Russian State. The terms employed to describe the events were 
also different in each of the ex-Communist countries we studied. In Russia, the 
war is memorialized not as World War II, but as the Great Patriotic War. 
 
 
 
 
 
In both Ukraine and Estonia, several attempts have been made since the 
collapse  of the Soviet Union to move away from the Soviet conception of this 
period  and to simply approach it as ‘World War II’. In Ukraine, the revision of 
this period proved to be quite difficult. The Red Army’s victory over fascism, the 
massive  devastation  of the lands and suffering of the Soviet people during this 
war became a grand myth of patriotism, sacrifice and heroism which supported 
the idea of greatness of Soviet and, later, of Ukrainian people. 
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In Estonia, both the Nazi and Red Army soldiers are viewed as occupiers. 
The secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact are in the center of the War 
discussion. Furthermore, the dates of the Soviet deportations of the Balts in 1941 
and 1949 are  memorized. In Estonia, the national day of mourning (June 14) is 
officially dedicated to those who were persecuted, deported and murdered in the 
Gulag. The main themes in Estonian history education are linked to occupation, 
deportation, and the demographic changes caused by the Soviet policies. 
 
 
 
During the 1980s, and especially following perestroika, the restoration of 
the national past became an essential part of national revival in the republics. At 
first, the revival of national self-assertion in the republics started around the issue 
of national languages. In Ukraine a number of measures was taken to limit the use 
of Russian and to  make Ukrainian the main language of public spheres. After 
1991, even Russian-speaking Ukrainians were encouraged to study in the national 
 
language. 
 
 
 
 
In  Estonia  in  the  early  nineties,  the  legislation  was  passed  by  the 
government to protect and disseminate Estonian language. Estonian became the 
only   official  language  in  the  country  and  the  primary  language  used  in 
government organizations, higher education, and public spheres. 
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The textbooks in each of the three countries also changed a lot since the 
last  generation  of  the  Soviet  literature  on  the  subject.  In  each  of  the  three 
countries,  and especially in Russia, history became an important instrument in 
building a new national identity in the post-Soviet world and creating an image 
of  a  once  again  strong  and  powerful  state.  Consequently,  in  the  twenty-first 
century Russia, theories of  Russia’s historical uniqueness were reintroduced in 
history textbooks as an antidote to the post-Soviet senses of guilt and humiliation 
of the nineties. 
 
 
 
The Ukrainian history textbooks have changed many times over the years. 
However, they remained exceptionally critical of the foreign rulers.  They aimed 
to foster patriotism amongst younger population of Ukrainians by suggesting that 
freedom for the Ukrainian people can only be guaranteed by an existence of an 
independent Ukrainian state. The treatment of ethnic others became an important 
aspect of history education in Ukraine. The new history textbooks concentrate on 
harmful effects of contact with  ‚ethnic  others‛ and the positive results of such 
encounters are often downplayed or omitted. 
 
 
 
In Estonia, the 1990 interpretation divided history of the country in three 
 
‘blocks’ – Russian, German and Soviet occupation. Ethnic Estonian and Russian- 
speaking students in Estonian schools still follow this historical chronology.  But 
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at  the  same  time  in  Estonia,  unlike  in  Ukraine  or  Russia,  the  new  history 
conception  was  not  necessarily  tied  to  the  nation-building.  It  was  mostly 
influenced by the ‘exile’ historiography; it was an attempt to find truly Estonian 
roots.   However,  as  we  have  mentioned  earlier,  ethnic  intolerance,  being  a 
component   of   a   national   identity,   can   become   a   major   obstacle   to   the 
development of truly  democratic society in any country of the  former Soviet 
Union. The numerous conflicts have occurred in recent years in several ex-Soviet 
republics and these developments indicate the importance of ethnic tolerance in 
post-communist  societies.  The  nationalization  of  either  Russian,  Ukrainian  or 
Estonian education may prove to be detrimental to these societies. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Russian education system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  OECD,  Reviews  of  National  Policies  in   Education:   the 
Russian Federation , p. 170. Copyright OECD, 1998. 
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Figure 2. Ukrainian educational system: 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/countryreports/ukraine/Image219.gif 
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Figure 3. Estonian Educational System: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Leonardo  da Vinci Pilot Project, Competenze Interculturali 
per formatori e consulenti che lavorano nel  campo dell'orientamanto 
professionale, 
http://www.arzinai.lt/intcomp/images/stories/database/english/estoniaed.png 
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Table 1.1 Russian population distribution in Russian Federation, Ukraine and 
 
Estonia, by 1989 (in thousands of persons). Source: 1989 population census.190 
 
 
 
Republic Total Population Russian population Russian   percentage 
of total population 
Russian Federation 147 000 119 865 81.5 
Ukraine 51 425 11 356 22.1 
Estonia 1 565 475 30.3 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 Number of students of special secondary schools and institutions of 
higher education receiving education in the languages of the Soviet nationalities, 
by September 1990 (in thousands of persons).191 
 
 
Republic Special secondary schools - 
number 
Special  secondary  schools- 
percent of all students 
Russian Federation: 
In Russian 
2 261 99.6 
Ukraine: In Ukrainian 160 21.2 
Ukraine: In Russian 501 66.2 
Estonia: In Estonian 12 65.4 
Estonia: In Russian 7 34.6 
Table  1.3  Percentage  distribution  of  students  receiving  education  in  the  state 
 
languages of their republics by September 1990.192 
 
 
 
 
 
190   Cited in Khazanov, Anatoly M., After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Madison, Wisconsin, The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1995, p. 247. 
191   Ibid., p. 249. Source: Vestnik statistiki, vol. 12 (1991), pp. 53-54. 
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Republic Secondary schools Percentage of the titular 
nationality in the entire 
population of the republic 
(per 1989 census) 
Russian Federation – in 
 
Russian 
98.1 81.9 
Ukraine – in Ukrainian 47.9 72.7 
Estonia – in Estonian 63 61.5 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Languages in Ukraine in 2001 (in thousands of persons). 
 
 
 
Group Population Native Ukrainian Russian 
Ukrainians 37 542 31 971 31 971 5 545 
Russians 8 334 7 994 328 7 994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
192  Ibid., p. 251. Source: Vestnik statistiki, vol. 12 (1991), p. 247. 
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Table 2.2 Language and identity in Ukraine (in per cents).193 
 
 
Language/ 
 
identity 
Ukrainians Russians Other Total 
Ukrainian 71.3 2.8 7.8 54.4 
Russian 14.9 87.6 36.6 30.4 
Ukrainian   and 
 
Russian 
13.6 9.5 6.3 12.4 
Other 0.2 0.1 49.3 2.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Historical comparison of the population in Ukraine (in per cents).194 
 
 
 
 1991-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 
Ukrainians 
 
(Ukrainophones) 
41.2 46.3 45.4 
Ukrainians 
 
(Russophones) 
32.6 28.2 30.9 
Russians 
 
(Russophones) 
19.7 17 16.5 
Other groups 6.5 8.5 7.2 
Total 100 100 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
193   State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2001, Khmelko, 2004, cited in Polese, Abel, ‚The 
Formal and the Informal: Exploring ‘Ukrainian’ Education in Ukraine, Scenes from 
Odessa, Comparative Education, vol. 46, no. 1 (February 2010), p. 49. 
194   Ibid. 
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Table 3.1 Number of students by language of instruction: 1990-2002 in Estonia.195 
 
Academic year Estonian Russian 
1990/1991 138,288 80,519 
1991/1992 137,274 79,691 
1992/1993 137,133 73,058 
1993/1994 138,996 70,020 
1994/1995 142,151 70,224 
1995/1996 145,276 69,286 
1996/1997 148,316 67,345 
1997/1998 151,478 66,023 
1998/1999 153,848 63,729 
1999/2000 154,747 61,094 
2000/2001 154,499 57,685 
2001/2002 153,304 54,308 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
195  Haridus Ministeerium, ‘Üldharidus’,  www.hm.ee. 
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In order to facilitate future research in this area, I have decided to include 
several chapters from the history textbooks analyzed in this work. This material 
cannot be found in Montreal’s libraries and represents a valuable addition to the 
research work. 
